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"If you or any American has to choose between being a good parent and




With these words, President Clinton announced his plans to help
Americans balance their responsibilities to their jobs and families. In a
commencement speech at Grambling State University, Clinton introduced his
proposals for increasing the affordability of leaves taken to care for a family
2member. This speech set off a flurry of activity among state legislatures,
1. Grambling Speech: President Clinton and Vice-President Gore: Working to Strengthen Families




policy analysts and business coalitions, who are all trying to answer the
question, "Who should be responsible for insuring family risks?"
Managing a family is demanding, especially when combined with
participation in the external work force. Adult workers have always had family
responsibilities that at times have conflicted with workplace demands. In
recent years, however, several factors have combined to increase the
opportunity for this conflict. These factors include an increase in the number of
families with both parents in the workforce, an increase in the number of one-
parent families, and an aging population that has led to an increased number of
families caring for elderly relatives. But perhaps the leading factor contributing
to an increased tension between work and family, however, has been the
increased number of women in the work force.3
Workers are subject to numerous risks that may cause them to leave the
work force and forego labor income. For the most part, these risks are insured
through the American social insurance system. For example, the risk that old
age or permanent disability will require one to leave the work force is insured
by the Social Security system. The risk that work-related injury will cause
absence from the work force is insured through state workers' compensation
systems. The risk of involuntary job loss is insured by the unemployment
insurance system. Workers face another category of risk, however, that
frequently causes absence from the work force but that has gone largely
unaddressed. The risk that a family breadwinner will have to temporarily leave
the work force in order to achieve an appropriate balance between work and
family is incurred by millions of families each year, yet, there is no social
insurance safety net providing income replacement to those workers.
This Article addresses the question of who should bear that risk. Starting
with President Clinton's words above, it begins with the normative premise that
both workers and our country pay a terrible price when workers have to choose
between their families and the labor income they depend on to support them.
Recent events signal that our nation may be ready to say that for some family
risks, we simply will not force our citizens to make that awful choice.
For example, accommodating the need to balance work and family has
been on the agenda of Congress and state legislatures since the 1980s. The first
family leave law was passed by Washington state in 1989, with several other
states soon following suit. In 1993, Congress passed the federal Family and
Medical Leave Act (FMLA),4 after the issue spent nearly ten years on the
Congressional agenda. Family leave laws that have been passed to date,
however, provide largely for unpaid, job-protected leave, and narrowly define
the family risks that come within the laws' scope. Due to this limitation, states
3. U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, FUTUREWORK: TRENDS AND CHALLENGES FOR WORK IN THE 2 1T
CENTURY 28 (1999) [hereinafter FUTUREWORK].
4. Pub. L. No. 103-3, 107 Stat. 6 (codified at 5 U.S.C. § 6831 et seq. and 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601-54).
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and Congress have frequently considered expanding the family leave statutes.
Proposals have been advanced to expand the risks covered by job-protected
leave, the employees eligible for protection, and the family members on whose
behalf leave may be taken.
In 1996, the bipartisan Commission on Family Leave called for
consideration of a uniform system of wage replacement for family leave. To
further this purpose, the Department of Labor (DOL) issued regulations in June
2000 allowing states to create experimental programs utilizing state
Unemployment Insurance (UI) systems, and many states are now considering
legislation that would capitalize on the new rule. The DOL's decision to fund
family risks through the UI system has been hotly contested, resulting in a
lawsuit and a national campaign by business alliances to overturn the
regulations. 5 Policy analysts and legislatures are exploring numerous other
possibilities for insuring family risks.
Inspired by this national controversy, this Article attempts a full
examination of the topic of family risk insurance, and develops
recommendations for a comprehensive national family policy. Beginning with
an analysis of the demographic changes that have facilitated the need to
consider insuring this risk, the Article then analyzes the various family risks
that workers face, and which of those risks might be appropriate for social
insurance. It next highlights the existing systems that provide some form of
insurance to workers who are required to temporarily leave the work force for
family reasons and examines recent proposals for providing family risk
insurance, drawn from both legislative agendas and the academic literature.
Finally, the Article proposes a hybrid approach to solving this dilemma-both
updating current systems and creating new ones to insure those risks that
cannot appropriately be handled by systems already in place.
I. BACKGROUND
This first Section of the Article lays the framework for a system to insure
family risks. Beginning with a description of the demographic changes
precipitating the need to address this situation, this Section calls for creation of
a national family policy to address demographic changes and to provide a
safety net for American workers. After examining the meaning of "family" in
American social insurance and the family risks that may cause workers to leave
the work force, the final portion of this Section attempts to match family risks
with the various systems that might be used to insure them.
5. See National Partnership for Women & Families, Providing Family Leave Benefits Through
Unemployment Insurance, Questions & Answers,
http://www.nationalpartnership.org/Content.cfm?Ll=202&TypeID=l &NewsltemID=285 (last visited




A better understanding of the current need to address family risks can be
gleaned by examining the history of our labor force and the evolution of
American family structure and function. Elizabeth Thompson recounts this
early history as follows:
Many perceptions of labor and family stem from traditional ideas
dating back to the seventeenth century when the family was a self-
sustaining economic unit with the male as the laborer and the female as
the homemaker and nurturer of the children. This family structure
remained in place until the nineteenth century when America began its
change from an agrarian to an industrialized nation. Change brought
adjustments in our social structures. Families moved to urban areas,
men got jobs in factories, and women stayed at home to care for
children .... Throughout these years and through the mid-twentieth
century, males dominated the labor force. It was not until the early
twentieth century and into the Depression era that women began to
leave the home in large numbers to earn money to help the family
survive. Because of years of male domination in the workplace,
lawmakers and employers considered only male needs when
constructing rules affecting the workplace. Not surprisingly, these
rules often discriminated against women who tried to enter such
workplaces and perpetuated perceptions that only males belonged in
the labor force.6
Indeed, the bulk of the American social insurance system was crafted
during the New Deal era, when this norm of a male-dominated workplace was
prevalent. The composition of the American work force, however, has changed
dramatically since the 1930s. Over the past few decades, women have left the
domestic sphere in increasing numbers in order to seek market employment. In
the period between 1940 and 1998, the percentage of American women in the
work force increased from 28% to 60% . The number of working married
women with children increased by 84% between 1969 and 1996,8 and by 1998,
two-thirds of all married mothers were in the work force.9 As a result of this
increased work force participation, the typical American family "no longer
consists of a father employed outside the home and a mother who, because she
6. Elizabeth F. Thompson, Comment, Unemployment Compensation: Women and Children - The
Denials, 46 U. MIAMI L. REV. 751, 755 (1992) (emphasis added).
7. FUTUREWORK, supra note 3, at 28 (citation omitted).
8. Id. at 30.
9. Id. at 30 (citing Howard V. Hayghe, Developments in Women's Labor Force Participation,
MONTHLY LABOR REVIEW, Sept. 1997, at 42). Several factors have been credited with this increase in
women's labor force participation, including rising labor market opportunities for women, the need for a
second income to keep apace with the cost of living, changing attitudes regarding women's roles in the
family, and reduced workplace discrimination against women. See id. at 28 (citing COUNCIL FOR
ECONOMIC ADVISORS (CEA), FAMILIES AND THE LABOR MARKET, 1969-1999: ANALYZING THE "TIME
CRUNCH" 6 (1999)).
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is not so employed, is available to care for children and other relatives in
need."'10 As Professor Malin notes, the nature of employment has also changed
for working mothers: "Whereas at one time, married women often were
characterized as secondary wage earners whose attachment to the labor force
was open to question, such is no longer the case."" As such, the frequency of
work-family conflicts has likely increased commensurately with the rate of
female work force participation during this period.
Another factor contributing to increased work-family conflicts is the
significant rise in the number of single-parent families, especially those headed
by women. 12 The proportion of single-parent families has more than doubled
over the last thirty years, from 11% of family households with children in 1970,
to 27% of such households in 1998. 13 In a comparable period, the percent of
working single mothers with children under eighteen increased from 53% to
66%. 14 Single parents are especially vulnerable to the risk of leaving the labor
force when family problems occur, because they do not have a spouse with
whom to divide family responsibilities. In addition, single parents generally
have less family income than married couples and are therefore less able to
purchase services (such as child-care services) that might alleviate the need to
temporarily leave the work force.
Today, many workers are in the position of simultaneously caring for their
children and their aging parents. t5  Individuals age sixty-five and older
currently make up twelve percent of the American population, and that number
continues to grow rapidly. 16 Nearly twenty percent of American households
reported caring for a person age fifty or older in the year 1996.17 The Families
and Work Institute expects this number to increase, and estimates that
approximately forty-two percent of workers will provide some form of elder
care in the year 2002.18 Nearly two out of three individuals providing care for
elders are working.' 9Six percent of caretakers report that they had to leave the
labor force entirely, and more than fifty percent report making changes at work,
10. Martin H. Malin, Part I: Unemployment Compensation and Eligibility: Unemployment
Compensation in a Time of Increasing Work-Family Conflicts, 29 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 131, 133 (Fall
1995 / Winter 1996).
11. Id. at 133 (citation omitted).
12. FUTUREWORK, supra note 3, at 30.
13. Id. at 30 (citing BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, GROWTH IN SINGLE
FATHERS OUTPACES GROWTH IN SINGLE MOTHERS (1998), available at http://www.census.gov/Press-
Release/www/family.html)
14. Id. at31.
15. Malin, supra note 10, at 134.
16. 1d. at 133.
17. FUTUREWOR., supra note 3, at 31.
18. Id. at 32 (citing ELLEN GALINSKY & JAMES T. BOND, FAMILIES AND WORK INSTITUTE, THE
1998 BUSINESS WORKLIFE STUDY 48 (1998)).
19. Fifty-two percent work full time and 12% work part-time. FUTUREWORK, supra note 3, at 31.
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such as leaving early, going in late, changing to a part-time work schedule, or
taking time off during the day.
20
The above mentioned changes in our nation's demography have increased
the tension between work and family, and have increased the likelihood that a
family breadwinner will need to temporarily cease labor force participation in
order to tend to family needs. The following Section describes the implications
of these changes for social policy.
B. Need for a Comprehensive Family Policy and Updated Social Insurance
Systems
Establishing that families face risks that may cause a worker to leave the
workforce does not answer the question of who should bear the burden of those
risks. Currently, the family unit is generally required to self-insure and bear the
full costs when a breadwinner must leave the work force to tend to family
needs. Some employees who work for large and generous employers receive
income replacement during such absences, which makes those employers
another candidate for bearing this risk. Finally, the government might also bear
this risk, as it does with old age or permanent disability, by providing social
insurance.
The question, "Who should bear the risk?" has been asked with more
frequency in the last several years, and begs another question: "What is the
appropriate role for government in this area?" In a recent article on family and
work policy, Lisa Borstein suggests that as we think about the appropriate role
for government, "we must move beyond the New Deal theme of help for the
common working man, and strike a new theme of help for the working
family." 21  Demographic changes have made it necessary to update social
insurance systems, and, as Bomstein suggests, this update should reflect the
current reality of the labor force and the family.
Bornstein and others have noted that the United States government has
done little to help working families and lacks any comprehensive national
family policy. 22 Professor Selmi observes that the U.S. was among the last
industrialized nations to pass parental leave legislation, and that even when it
did, it adopted the least generous policy of any industrialized country. 21 Of the
20. Id.
21. Lisa Bornstein, Inclusions and Exclusions in Work-Family Policy: The Public Values and
Moral Code Embedded in the Family and Medical Leave Act, 10 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 77 (2000).
22. Id. at 77.
23. Michael Selmi, Family Leave and the Gender Wage Gap, 78 N.C. L. REV. 707, 709 (2000).
Selmi highlights the United States' weak commitment to facilitating work and family issues by
examining its expenditures on other workplace benefits:
As a society, we spend more than $60 billion annually on workers' compensation, with
another $20 billion devoted to unemployment benefits. In addition to these workplace
benefits, we also subsidize health insurance and pensions, as well as non-workplace items
such as home mortgages-all of which cost billions of dollars annually. Nevertheless, when
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130 countries that have family leave policies, only three-the United States,
Australia and Ethiopia-provide unpaid leave.24
Bornstein believes that the lack of governmental action in the area of work
and family issues can be attributed to constraint "by values of privacy,
autonomy, self-sufficiency, and minimal government interference;,, 25  or,
phrased differently, by a belief that the family unit alone should bear the risk.
Bornstein notes that demographic changes are forcing the government to
confront the reality of the work-family dilemmas faced by many Americans.
Where the government has confronted these issues, she characterizes its
interventions as "limited to piecemeal responses to headline grabbing
outrages. '26 Deborah Rhode harshly criticizes these piecemeal responses, and
asserts that the government "needs to assume greater responsibility for helping
individuals to accommodate work and family responsibilities.,
27
As detailed above, recent academic literature calls for the creation of a
national family policy and an increased governmental role in bearing family
risk. A flurry of legislative activity, discussed in Part II of this Article,
demonstrates that state and federal legislatures are actively investigating how
this might take shape. This Article suggests a number of changes that would
form a national family policy, update social insurance systems to help the
working family, and allocate risks among employees, employers, and the
government.
C. Defining "Family"
"As the structure of the labor market shifts from the traditional model of
the all-male workforce, society must deal with changing family structures. 28
This Section addresses family structure and how to define "family" for the
purposes of social insurance.
In talking about the need for family leave, the definition most often applied
is that contained in the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA), which limits
"family" to a spouse, son, daughter, or parent.29  Section 2611 of the Act
further defines these terms, explaining that spouse means a "husband or wife,"
it comes to facilitating family leave as a way of providing some balance between work and
family, we spend practically nothing on the federal level, primarily because we are concerned
about the effects the costs might have on employers and wages.
Id. at 710.
24. National Partnership for women & Families, Leave Policies: Percentage Paid, at
http://www.nationalpartnership.org/Content.cfm?l1=202&TypelD-I&NewsltemlD=304 (last visited
Mar. 22, 2002).
25. Bornstein, supra note 21, at 77.
26. Id. at 77.
27. Deborah L. Rhode, Symposium: Changing Images of the State: Feminism and the State, 107
HARv. L. REV. 1181, 1197 (1994).
28. Thompson, supra note 6, at 751.
29. 26 U.S.C. § 2612(a)(1)(A)-(C).
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son or daughter means a "biological, adopted, or foster child, a stepchild, a
legal ward, or a child of a person standing in loco parentis," who is either
"under 18 years of age," or "18 years of age or older and incapable of self-care
because of a mental or physical disability," and that parent means "the
biological parent of an employee or an individual who stood in loco parentis"
to the employee.30
The FMLA's definition of family is not completely satisfactory, however,
because it ignores some family members for whom workers have care-taking
responsibility. For example, the Act excludes from protection leaves to care for
grandparents, parents-in-law, domestic partners, adult children, or siblings.
Noting this deficiency, several states apply a more expansive definition of
"family member" for leave purposes.
31
If the purpose of social insurance is to protect workers from loss of income
due to inability to participate in the labor market, then the definition of family
should be broad enough to encompass the reality that workers face. Excluding
domestic partners or in-laws from coverage might be interpreted as reflecting a
societal value that individuals should not be supported in their efforts to care
for these loved ones.32 The irony is that FMLA supporters in Congress often
declared that "as a matter of basic policy, American workers should not be
forced to choose between caring for their loved ones and their jobs. 33 Yet, by
defining family in the narrow fashion that it does, the Act perpetuates the need
30. 26 U.S.C. § 2611. The Department of Labor's (DOL) interpretive regulations clarify these
terms to some degree, adding that the definition of spouse includes "common law marriage in States
where it is recognized," and that the definition of parent specifically excludes parents "in law." See 29
C.F.R. § 825.113(a)-(b).
31. The District of Columbia, for example, includes all individuals related by blood, legal custody,
or marriage, and people with whom employees live and have a committed relationship. Hawaiian leave
law includes in-laws, grandparents, and grandparents-in-law. Oregon and Vermont both include the
spouse's parent in the definition of family. See National Partnership for Women & Families, State
Family Leave Laws that are More Expansive than the Federal Family and Medical Leave Act, at
http://www.nationalpartnership.org/Content.cfm?Li=202&TypeID=l&NewsltemlD=259 (last visited
Mar. 22, 2002). Along similar lines, at least one state has defined family broadly in the context of
unemployment insurance. Washington state law permits a good cause exception for employees who
leave employment because of domestic responsibilities. Washington's definition of immediate family
does not encompass unmarried cohabitating adults, but does include the "individual's spouse, children
(including unborn children), stepchildren, foster children, or parents of either spouse, whether living
with the individual or not, and other relatives who temporarily or permanently reside in the individual's
household." See Kirsten Hagedom Frey, Comment, Employment Law -The Erosion of the Voluntary
Quit Disqualification from Unemployment Compensation Benefits: Reep v. Commissioner of the
Department of Employment & Training, 19 IOWA J. CORP. L. 183 & n.108 (1993) (citing WASH.
ADMIN. CODE § 192-16-013(3)(b) (1992)).
32. Bornstein criticizes the FMLA as having cultural assumptions at the root of its policy. See
Bornstein, supra note 21, at 81. She asserts that the exclusions "reflect a moral code, pronouncing
which individuals and families are entitled to the coverage and security of a national policy, and which
are not." Id. By excluding certain individuals and family arrangements from its protections, she asserts,
the FMLA "preserve[s] a vision of the family that is presumptively nuclear, heterosexual, middle-class
and male-headed . I..." Id. at 104.
33. Malin, supra note 10, at 132.
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to make this choice when a family member falling outside the Act's coverage
34requires care.
This Article includes a prefatory note that in designing a national family
policy, we should consider moving beyond the FMLA's narrow definition of
family. There are endless possibilities for how this might be accomplished for
the purposes of social insurance. One possibility is to adopt a broader statutory
definition of family-specifying more qualifying relationships in the statutory
language-in order to be more reflective of reality. To avoid any cultural
imposition, another option would be simply to allow the employee to designate
in advance who is part of his or her "family" for purposes of the law, or to
include any individual for whom the employee is the primary care-taker.35 This
Article does not attempt to pick the "right" definition. It merely assert that the
FMLA definition does not capture the current reality, and that an insurance
system intended to protect income from family risks would need to reach
beyond these narrow confines.
D. Defining "Family Risks"
The risks that workers face as members of family units are a key
consideration in designing a system of family risk insurance. The Article's
starting point for defining "family risks" is to address those changes in work
requirements or family circumstances that require a family breadwinner to miss
work or temporarily leave the work force in order to achieve an appropriate
balance between work and family. As it did with the defmition of family, the
Article will begin this task by examining coverage under the FMLA.
The first category of risks this might be insured, those covered by the
FMLA's job-protected leave mandate, includes the following risks that may
cause a family breadwinner to miss work: (1) the birth of a son or daughter and
time off to care for such son or daughter within the 12-month period following
birth; (2) the placement of a son or daughter for adoption or foster care during
the 12-month period beginning on the date of placement; (3) the care of a
spouse, son, daughter or parent with a serious health condition; and (4) the
employee's own serious health condition (including pregnancy) that renders the
employee unable to perform the functions of his or her position. 36 Workers,
34. Bomstein concurs with this position, stating that the values imbedded in the FMLA "function to
perpetuate many of the problems that the Act intended to rectify." See Bomstein, supra note 21, at 82.
35. Of course, the more individuals who are included in the definition, the more costly any system
may become. To limit the possibilities, employees might be limited as to the number of individuals they
can designate as "family members" for insurance purposes.
36. 26 U.S.C. § 2612(a)(1)(A)-(D); 29 C.F.R. § 825.114(a)(2)(ii) While the employee's own
serious health condition technically falls under the rubric of "medical" as opposed to "family leave," this
Article includes it within the definition of family risks for several reasons. First, as the FMLA put the
categories together, they are being treated as a unit by many states considering family risk insurance.
Second, this FMLA category includes pregnancy, which has obvious relation to family risks. Third,
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however, face numerous family risks outside the FMLA's scope that require
absence from the work force.
These risks might be divided into several conceptual categories. Thus, the
second category of risks that might be insured would include those changes in
work requirements that force employees to miss work in order to tend to family
needs. This might occur when an employer changes the terms of employment
such that they create a conflict with the employee's domestic obligations, or
when the terms of a collective bargaining agreement have similar effect.3 7 This
category would also include the requirement that an employee work
unscheduled overtime or that the employee change his or her normal start time
in a way that conflicts with existing child- or elder-care arrangements. Other
risks in this category might include being assigned work duties that the
employee is unable to perform due to a serious health condition (including
pregnancy), or that would put the employee's family in danger (e.g., requiring a
breast-feeding mother to work with chemicals that may harm her infant).
Employees faced with this situation will typically ask for an accommodation
from the employer, which may consist of either withdrawal of the employer's
request, or a temporary reprieve so that the employee can make alternate
arrangements. Professor Malin notes that "Although many employers have
become more 'family friendly' in their human resource policies, they do not
view accommodation of family responsibilities as an employee's entitlement
and retain the option to say 'no' when they deem it necessary. 38 Where the
employer refuses the accommodation, the employee may be discharged for
refusing orders, or may quit rather than comply, either of which may result in a
period of unemployment.
Workers also face many family risks caused by their family unit or forces
external to either the family or the employer. For purposes of analysis, these
risks can be divided into several categories, roughly tied to the expected
duration of the absence and the employee's availability for work.
Thus, a third overall category of family risks would include absences that
may be very short, such as a partial workday or only one to two workdays.
Absences included in this category might be characterized as "emergency care"
and "appointments." An example of "emergency care" would be an
unexpected school closing that leaves parents of school-age children suddenly
keeping the categories together is useful because it makes paid benefits something that men want and
will use as much as women. Insuring the medical side helps keep this a benefit for both sexes, which
will also discourage hiring and wage discrimination. See infra notes 101-104 and accompanying text.
37. See Deborah Maranville, Symposium: New Approaches to Poverty Law, Teaching, and
Practice: Changing Economy, Changing Lives: Unemployment Insurance and the Contingent
Workforce, 4 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 291, 313 (1995). Deborah Maranville believes that the two changes in
this category having the greatest impact on workers are the conversion of a part-time job to full-time or
the transfer of an employee from her usual shift to one that is in conflict with family obligations such as
child or elder care. See id. at 315.
38. Malin, supra note 10, at 132.
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without child-care arrangements. Ill children pose similar problems, because
schools and daycares often will not care for them, and a parent may not be
entitled to leave under FMLA because the child's illness does not qualify as a
serious health condition. Similarly, an employee may need to miss work to
recuperate from his or her own non-FMLA-eligible illness. "Appointments"
would include absences to transport an ill family member to the doctor, as well
as medical and dental visits for an employee or family member that need to be
scheduled during work hours. Other examples would include activities for the
educational advancement of a child, such as interviewing for a new school,
attending parent-teacher conferences, or attending school or community
activities.
Other family risks may entail absences of several days' or weeks' duration.
This fourth category would include absences for "continued care" and for
"changes in family structure." An example of "continued care" would occur if
a worker suddenly loses the availability of child-care because a caretaker falls
ill, moves to a new area, or otherwise discontinues services. Likewise, workers
who suddenly become responsible for elder care, or whose existing
arrangements fall through, may need time off from work to locate nursing- or
group-home or other professional services related to elder's care. Until suitable
care is found, the worker may need to leave work to provide care him- or
herself. Examples of "changes in family structure" would include such trials as
a death in the family, a divorce, or a missing person. For example, workers
who lose a loved one may require time away from work for bereavement or to
arrange and attend a funeral. The death of an immediate family member may
often entail time away from work to settle the deceased's estate. Workers may
have to appear in probate court, meet with financial institutions and insurance
providers, make arrangements to sell the deceased's real estate, and, in rare
cases, arrange for custody of orphaned children. This category also includes
employee absences to attend matters related to the transition from marriage to
separation or divorce, such as relocating to a new residence, meeting with
attorneys, or appearing in court for divorce or child custody proceedings.
Workers may also need time off in order to search for a missing family
member, such as a runaway or kidnapped child or an elder who wanders off
and cannot be found.
Still other family risks may require complete separation from the current
employer, yet allow the worker to remain available for work and begin a new
job search almost immediately. "Relocation" risks fall into this fifth category.
Workers who are victims of domestic violence, for example, may be required to
relocate in order to ensure their own safety and that of their children. Other
examples include workers whose spouses are forced by an employer to




The classification of risks into the five categories listed above is somewhat
amorphous, and some absences do not fit neatly into a single category. The
following Section re-categorizes these risks, further discusses who should bear
them, and examines whether an existing form of family risk insurance might
cover them. As part of this discussion, the following Section outlines the basic
elements of what will hereinafter be referred to as the "Family Risk Insurance
Proposal" ("FRIP" or "the Proposal"), which is a series of recommendations for
a national family policy, the specific elements of which will be developed and
supported throughout the remainder of this Article.
E. Insuring Family Risks
The first category of family risks discussed in the previous Section
included those risks currently protected by the FMLA. The FMLA was
designed to guarantee workers time off from work in times of serious family
need or transition. As the authors of the FMLA chose to protect only those
absences related to major changes in family functioning, these risks appear to
be the type that are appropriate for social insurance. For reasons forthcoming
in Section II.B.1, the dominant approach to insuring these risks, expansion of
the Ul system, is the wrong approach. Section II.B.2 explains that this category
could be most appropriately covered via a national expansion of the Temporary
Disability Insurance (TDI) systems currently existing in several states. Thus,
the first element of the Proposal entails wage replacement for FMLA-
qualifying risks through a national TDI program.
The second category of family risks addressed by FRIP might be called
"employer-induced work changes." In cases where these changes result in a
complete separation from employment, the Proposal would provide income
replacement under the Unemployment Insurance (UI) system. Section II.B. 1
contends that separations due to this risk should be considered good cause
attributable to the employer. Because the workers in this category remain able
and available to work, but just not for that particular employer under the new
conditions of employment, insuring this risk under UI would be generally
consistent with other UI provisions, and the system would require little
adjustment to accommodate this risk. In cases where an employer grants an
accommodation in the form of time off to resolve the family situation, FRIP
would provide insurance under category three or four below, as appropriate.
The third category of risks addressed by the Proposal can be called "short-
term absences to tend to family business," and would include any absences for
"emergency care" and "appointments" that last three or fewerwork days. While
FRIP would mandate up to twenty-four hours of job-protected leave each year
for such purposes in Section II.A.1, it would continue to leave costs of these
risks wherever they currently lie. For some workers, this would mean that the
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risks must be self-insured. Other workers could easily avoid loss of wages by
utilizing their employers' paid leave programs, such as sick leave or vacation,
described in Section II.A.2. The Proposal excludes these risks from wage
replacement based on a determination that they are inappropriate for social
insurance because they cause small, if any, shocks to family income, and
because they are more susceptible to moral hazard than many other family
risks. Each worker should expect that a certain number of days or weeks each
year will be consumed by these normal family occurrences, and can reasonably
plan by reserving vacation or sick days or saving money from each paycheck.
The only exception to this hands-off approach would be the use of welfare
reinvestment funds to provide income replacement to low-income families
faced with such risks in cases where the employer does not provide income
replacement and the absence exceeds one-half workday in duration. This
approach is advocated in Section II.B.3, because low-wage workers are least
likely to have employer-provided benefits to cover such absences, to be able to
afford alternative arrangements, or to be able to self-insure.
The fourth category of family risks addressed by FRIP can be called
"extended absences to tend to family business." While this category includes
the subcategories "continued care" and "changes in family structure," it would
also include any verifiable absences due to compelling family circumstances.
In every case, the risk would not be considered insurable unless the particular
situation caused the worker to miss more than three consecutive workdays.
Absences more than three days are more insurable because they are not
expected to occur on an annual basis, or in some cases, even within a worker's
lifetime. These risks have the potential to produce shocks to family income and
to exacerbate the stress that such events cause. These absences do not fall
neatly under the umbrella of any existing social insurance program, and would
require the development of a new social insurance program as described in Part
III. These risks have been selected for differential treatment because they do
not fall under the umbrella of the FMLA, nor do they appropriately fall under
UI because the worker does not remain able and available for work. Since
these risks have not yet merited even an unpaid leave mandate, it would be
difficult to convince legislators that they merit treatment equal to that accorded
FMLA absences. Thus FRIP would insure them with a new system funded by
employee contributions and would provide less generous wage replacement
than for FMLA absences.
The fifth and final category of family risks addressed by FRIP can be
called "relocation-related absences." The two examples of family risks
included in this category, domestic violence and spousal relocation, are
increasingly being covered by UI systems. FRIP assigns them to that system
because they can easily be encompassed within UI's "good cause" quit
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exception and because these workers remain able and available for work, as
discussed in Section II.B. .39
For each of the categories in which the use of TDI or UI systems is
adopted, FRIP would also include a safety net for low-income workers who do
not meet the minimum earnings eligibility for these programs. Section II.B.3
advocates the use of welfare reinvestment surpluses to fund income
replacement to these workers if they would otherwise be eligible under the
terms of UI or TDI.
To summarize, the assignment of family risks discussed in Section I.D can
be mapped to the five categories of risks addressed by FRIP as follows:
FAMILY RISK FROM RISK CLASSIFICATION SYSTEM USED TO
SECTION I.D IN SECTION I.E INSURE UNDER FRIP
1) FMLA Qualifying 1) FMLA Qualifying • Temporary Disability
Insurance (TDI)
- TANF safety net for
low wage workers
2) Changes in Work 2) "Employer-Induced * Depends on duration of
Requirements Work Changes" absence (see "Short-term
" Work hours/Start • If employee is given Absences to Tend to
time time off to resolve the Family Business" and
• Overtime situation--) "Extended Absences to
• Increased risk/danger Tend to Family
Business" below)
If employee quits/is • "Good Cause" quit
fired because they exception granted under
cannot resolve the UI
situation--) - TANF safety-net for
low wage workers
3) Short Absences of 1- 3) "Short-term - Up to 24 hours annual
2 days Absences to Tend to job-protected, unpaid
• "Emergency Care" Family Business" leave (self-insurance)
" "Appointments" • "Emergency Care" 3 • TANF safety-net for
or fewer consecutive low-wage workers
work days
• "Appointments" 3 or
fewer consecutive work
days
39. In the case of domestic violence, if the worker is unavailable for work due to divorce, moving,
counseling, etc., the worker's absence would instead be insured as a change in family structure or
compelling family circumstance under category four.
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4) Absences for several
days/weeks
• "Continued Care"
" "Changes in Family
Structure"
4)"Extended Absences
to Tend to Family
Business"
- "Continued Care" for
more than 3
consecutive work days







for more than 3
consecutive work days
New system funded by
employee contributions
5) Separation from 5) "Relocation-Related • "Good Cause" quit
Employer Absences" exception granted
"Relocation Risks" • Domestic Violence under UI
such as Domestic - Spousal Relocation • TANF safety-net for
Violence or Spousal low-wage workers
Relocation
This allocation of risks is designed to preserve the fundamental goals of
existing social insurance systems, while providing additional security to
families. The risks selected for social insurance include those that cause the
greatest shock to family income, that present the smallest moral hazard risks,
and where it would be most troublesome to require a worker to make a choice
between family needs and labor income.
II. POSSIBLE SYSTEMS FOR INSURING FAMILY RISKS
This portion of the Article examines the various private and social
insurance systems already in existence that might be used to insure family
risks. It describes the programs that fall within each category, recent proposals
to expand coverage to encompass family risks, and conclusions and
recommendations regarding each.
A. Private Mechanisms
Currently, the primary means workers have to deal with family risks are
private. Workers leaving the work force to tend to family needs typically rely
on their own resources or those of their employers. This Section describes
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three private mechanisms for insuring family risks-self-insurance, employer-
provided benefits, and individual insurance policies. It highlights their benefits
and limitations, and why they have proven insufficient to provide a safety net
for American workers.
1. Self-Insurance and the Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993
The primary federal legislation governing family risks is the Family and
Medical Leave Act.40  The Act mandates both that the employee's job be
protected41 and that the employer maintains group health plan benefits during
the leave period.42 The Act, however, does not require that the employee
receive wage replacement while on leave.
At the time of the Act's inception, Congress created the Commission on
Family Leave, a bi-partisan body that would evaluate the Act's successes and
deficiencies. The Commission has undertaken two studies of the FMLA's
impact on workers and employers. Relying on this data, the following Section
describes how workers have operated under the FMLA's system of unpaid
leave mandates and self-insurance. It also examines the limitations of the Act's
coverage and recent proposals to expand protections.
a. Description of FMLA Leave
As previously described, the FMLA requires covered employers to provide
eligible workers with up to twelve weeks per year of unpaid leave for the birth,
adoption or placement of a child, the employee's own serious health condition,
or to care for a child, spouse or parent with a serious health condition.43 To
receive FMLA protection, however, employees must work for a "covered
employer," a category encompassing only public agencies and private
employers with fifty or more employees. 44 Employees must also meet several
eligibility requirements, such as completing twelve months of service with the
employer and working at least 1,250 hours during the most recent twelve-
month period.45 In addition, employees are covered only if there are at least
fifty employees at the worksite or within a seventy-five-mile radius of the
46worksite.
These eligibility requirements exclude many workers from the Act's
protection. The fifty-employee requirement has resulted in only 10.8% of
40. See supra note 4.
41. 29 U.S.C. § 2614 (a)(1) (2000).
42. 29 U.S.C. § 2614 (c)(I) (2000).
43. 29 U.S.C. § 2612(a)(1) (2000).
44. 29 U.S.C. § 2611(4) (2000).
45. 29 U.S.C. § 2611(2)(A) (2000).
46. 29 U.S.C. § 2611(2)(B)(ii) (2000).
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private worksites being covered by the leave mandate.47 Surprisingly, this
small proportion of worksites encompasses 58.3% of the private sector
workforce (because a majority of employees work for large employers).
48
After applying employee service and hours criteria, only 46.9% of private
sector employees are eligible for leave under the Act.49
A significant number of workers need family leave each year. One study
covering an 18-month period found that 16.5% of workers had taken leave for a
FMLA reason. 5 An additional 2.4% of workers reported that they needed
leave but did not take it, meaning that 18.9% of all workers needed leave in the
relevant period.5' Of those employees who needed leave but did not take it,
77.6% reported that they did not take leave because they could not afford it.
52
Described differently, one out of every eight employees who needed FMLA
leave could not afford to take it. When asked, "If you had received some or
additional pay, would you have taken leave?" nearly 88% of this population
responded in the affirmative.
5 3
This affordability problem results because the FMLA requires only unpaid
leave for qualifying absences.54 More than half of workers taking FMLA leave
report that they worried about not having enough money to pay bills during the
leave period, and that they would have taken leave for a longer period if some
or additional pay had been received. 55 A survey of leave-takers 56 reveals how
families self-insure during these periods of unpaid leave: 47% reported living
off savings earmarked specifically for family leave, 35.6% reported living off
47. U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, BALANCING THE NEEDS OF FAMILIES AND EMPLOYERS: FAMILY AND
MEDICAL LEAVE SURVEYS 3-3 tbl.3.1 (2001) [hereinafter BALANCING THE NEEDS OF FAMILIES AND
EMPLOYERS].
48. See id. When public sector employers are included in the calculation, 77.6% of American
employees work for covered employers. See id. at A-2-21 tbl.A2-3. 1.
49. See id. at A-2-21 tbl.A2-3.2 (showing that 80.5% of covered employees are also meet eligibility
requirements). When public sector employees are included in the calculation, 61.7% of American
employees are eligible for FMLA leave. See id. at A-2-21 tbl.A2-3. 1.
50. Id. at 2-2 tbl.2.1. 52.4% of leaves were for the employee's own health condition, 7.9% for
pregnancy, 18.5% for birth or placement of a child, 11.5% for the care of an ill child, 6.4% for the care
of an ill spouse, and 13% for the care of an ill parent. Id. at 2-5 tbl.2.3.
51. Id. at 2-14 tbl.2.14. Within this group of workers who need leave but are unable to take it,
over-represented populations include women, Blacks and Hispanics, individuals who are
separated/divorced/widowed, those with children living within the household, those with less that a high
school education, those earning $20,000-430,000 annually, and those who work on an hourly basis. See
id. at A-2-11 tbl.A2-2.10.
52. Id. at 2-16 tbl.2.17. Thus, within the 18-month period covered by the survey, roughly 1.9% of
all American workers needed leave but could not afford to take it.
53. Id. at 2-17 tbl.2.18.
54. 29 C.F.R. § 825.207(a).
55. BALANCING THE NEEDS OF FAMILIES AND EMPLOYERS, supra note 47, at 4-2 tbl.4.1, 4-9
tbl.4.9.
56. This survey included those who were either unpaid or received only partial pay during the leave
period.
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savings earmarked for something else, and 29% borrowed money; 8.7%
resorted to public assistance.5 7
Many states have family leave mandates reaching beyond the requirements
of the FMLA and providing greater protection to their citizens. Three states
have comprehensive leave laws covering employers with fewer than 50
employees.8 Twelve states cover smaller employers, but provide this
population with narrower protections than the FMLA.59 Eight states require
leave for needs not covered by the FMLA, including leave for participation in
children's educational activities or for routine medical needs such as doctors'
appointments. 6° Several states provide leave for family members not covered
by the FMLA.
6 1
b. Proposals to Expand FMLA Leave
Noting the FMLA's deficiencies, Congress has considered expanding the
FMLA on several occasions. Currently, the House of Representatives is
considering Representative Woolsey's (D-CA) H.R. 226, known as "Family
Income to Respond to Significant Transitions Insurance Act" (FIRST).62  This
bill would provide federally funded leave grants to states to offer paid leave
through TDI or UI programs, private disability or other insurance programs, or
57. The percentages do not total 100% because the categories were not mutually exclusive. In
order to make money last longer, 75.5% limited spending on "extras," 38.8% put off paying bills, and
40.3% cut their leave short. See id. at 4-9 tbl.4.8. It should be noted that a disproportionate share of
those resorting to public assistance are women (12% of women leave-takers, as opposed to 9% overall,
resort to public assistance). National Partnership for Women & Families, Providing Family Leave
Benefits . Through Unemployment Insurance, Questions & Answers,
http://www.nationalpartnership.org/Content.cfm?LI=202&TypelD=I&NewsltemlD=285 (last visited
Mar. 22, 2002) [hereinafter Questions & Answers]; National Partnership for Women & Families, Family
Leave Insurance: Helping Families Afford to Take Leave,
http://www.nationalpartnership.org/Content.cfm?LI=202&TypelD=l&NewsltemlD=355 (last visited
Mar. 22, 2002).
58. These states include Vermont (employers with ten or more employees must provide leave for
families with new children, and those with 15 or more employees must provide leave for medical
conditions), District of Columbia (20 employees), and Oregon (25 employees). National Partnership for
Women & Families, supra note 31.
59. The majority of these states cover only maternity disability, including Hawaii (1 employee),
Montana (1 employee), Connecticut (3 employees), Iowa (4 employees), California (5 employees),
Massachusetts (6 employees), New Hampshire (6 employees), Louisiana (25 employees) and Puerto
Rice (all employees). Minnesota covers leave for birth or adoption (21 employees), Kentucky covers
leave to adopt a child under age seven (all employees) and Maine covers ten weeks of family and
medical leave every two years (15 employees). See id.
60. States covering educational activities include California (40 hours/year, no more than 8
hours/month), District of Columbia (24 hours/year), Illinois (8 hours/year, no more than 4 hours/day),
Louisiana (16 hours/year), Massachusetts (24 hours/year), Minnesota (16 hours/year), Nevada (no
maximum limits, but protects employees who attend conferences or are notified of the child's
emergency), and Vermont (24 hours/year, no more than 4 hours/month). Massachusetts and Vermont
provide 24 hours of leave per year for medical needs. Id.
61. See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
62. H.IL 226, 107th Cong. (2001).
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through other mechanisms provided by private employers.63  The Senate is
currently considering Senator Daschle's (D-SD) S. 18, also known as the
"Right Start Act of 2001."64 This bill would adopt FIRST's block grants. In
addition, it would expand the FMLA to cover all employers with 25 or more
employees, to provide unpaid leave to participate in activities related to
domestic violence, and would allow up to 24 hours of leave per year for
participation in a child's academic activities or in a family literacy training
program.65 Representative Maloney (D-NY) has introduced H.R. 2287, which
would amend the FMLA to permit leave for care of a domestic partner, parent-
in-law, adult child, sibling or grandparent with a serious health condition.
66
She has also introduced H.R. 2784, which would amend the FMLA to permit
leave for attendance at a child or grandchild's educational or extracurricular
activities up to four hours per month or twenty-four hours per year, and clarify
that leave may be taken for routine medical needs and to assist elderly
relatives. 67 One should not be too optimistic that Congress will adopt these
FMLA amendments this term; Congress considered numerous bills that would
68have had similar effects last term, but passed none.
c. Evaluation of Self-Insurance and FMLA Leave
A review of the foregoing information demonstrates that the FMLA's
coverage and job-protected leave are far from adequate to protect many
Americans' income security. Coverage and eligibility limitations exclude
almost one-half of American workers from its protections. Presumably,
workers falling under the Act's purview often find that their particular family
63. Id.
64. S. 18, 107th Cong. (2001). The companion bill is H.R. 265, 107th Cong. (2001).
65. Id.
66. H.R. 2287, 107th Cong. (2001).
67. H.R. 2784, 107th Cong. (2001).
68. See, e.g., S. 201, 106th Cong. (1999) (lowering small business exemption from 50 to 25
employees); S. 1304, 106th Cong. (1999) (allowing up to 24 hours of leave per year to participate in
school-related activities such as interviewing for a school, attending a parent-teacher conference, or
participating in literacy training); S. 1069, S. 51 & H.R. 357, 106th Cong. (1999) (providing FMLA
leave and U1 for various services associated with domestic violence); S. 1355 and H.R. 2500, 106th
Cong. (1999) (providing paid leave grants for FMLA leave); H.R. 91, 106th Cong. (1999) (lowering
small business exemption from 50 to 25 employees, allowing up to 24 hours of leave per year to
participate in school-related activities such as interviewing for a school, attending a parent-teacher
conference, allowing leave to take child or elderly relative to routine medical or dental appointments,
allowing leave to take an elderly relative to interview for a nursing/group home or other professional
services related to the elder's care); HR. 2103, 106th Cong. (1999) (lowering small business exemption
from 50 to 25 employees, allowing up to 4 hours each 30 days or 24 hours of leave per year for parental
involvement in an activity sponsored by a school or community organization attended by a son or
daughter); H.R. 1857, 106th Cong. (1999) (allowing FMLA leave for tests and procedures related to
giving living organ donations); H.R. 2104, 106th Cong. (1999) (allowing family leave to care for a
seriously ill grandparent, parent-in-law, domestic partner, adult child, or sibling); H.R 1478, 106th
Cong. (1999) (prohibiting discrimination against breastfeeding women); H.R. 3297, 106th Cong. (1999)
(eliminating 1,250 hours of service requirement).
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need is not covered, either because the family member who needs care does not
fall within the definition of "family" or because the particular situation does not
fit within the four categories meriting job protection. Moreover, the leave
guarantee's unpaid nature has the practical effect of stripping one in eight
eligible workers who need leave of that protection, because they are unable to
afford time off without pay. 69
To remedy the Act's deficiencies, FRIP would begin with the adoption of
the Right Start Act of 2001. The federal leave grants under FIRST could be
used to promote a national expansion of state TDI systems, to be discussed in
Section II.B.2. The bill's provision expanding coverage to employers with
twenty-five or more employees would provide protection to an additional
13.8% of the private sector work force, bringing the share of the covered
private sector work force to over seventy percent. 70  This considerable
expansion could be accomplished without affecting a large number of
employers and without a large impact on the employers' costs. 7' It would also
include adoption of the provision allowing 24 hours of unpaid leave per year to
participate in a child's academic activities, 72 or for routine and non-emergency
health needs as proposed in H.R. 2784.73  In all cases, FRIP would allow
employees to use this time only after they make all reasonable attempts not to
69. A survey of FMLA leave-takers revealed that groups least likely to receive paid leave included
women, Blacks and "All Others" (those who are not Black, White, Hispanic, or Asian), single
individuals, those who had a high school education or less, those earning less than $20,000 per year, and
hourly workers. BALANCING THE NEEDS OF FAMILIES AND EMPLOYERS, supra note 47, at A-2-31 tbl.
A2-4.1.
70. National Partnership for Women & Families, Family Leave for More Working People:
Expanding the FMLA to Cover Mid-Sized Businesses, http://www.nationalpartnership.org/ (last visited
Mar. 22, 2002).
71. Only 3.8% of non-covered worksites have 25-59 employees and would be affected by the
expansion.BALANCING THE NEEDS OF FAMILIES AND EMPLOYERS, supra note 47, at 7-3 fig. 7.2.
Currently, about 58,000 worksites of between 25 and 49 employees are covered by the Act (because
"they are part of a larger company with at least 50 employees within a 75-mile radius"). According to
the bipartisan Commission on Family Leave, the majority of these worksites found it easy and
inexpensive to comply with the FMLA. Seventy-five percent experienced little or no increase in
administrative costs, "83% experienced little or no increase in hiring and training costs, and 95%
experienced little or no increase in other costs." National Partnership for Women & Families, supra
note 70.
72. This provision is an important addition to the FMLA, because parents are often unable to take
the time they need to be involved in their children's education. Twenty-eight percent report facing
problems at work when they want to attend school activities, 23% report facing problems when they
need to attend parent-teacher conferences, and 40% believe that they are not devoting enough time to
their children's education. National Partnership for Women & Families, Family Leave for More Family
Needs (citing Camegie Foundation, 1993),
http://www.nationalpartnership.org/Content.cfm?Ll=202&TypeID=l&NewsltemlD=278 (last visited
Mar. 22,2002).
73. These risks are also significant. Twenty-four percent of parents report that they are faced with
problems at work when they have to care for a sick child. Id. Sixty-five percent of workers report
having missed work in the past year because of a child's illness or other emergency. Id. (citing
GREATER CINCINNATI BUSINESS COALITION ON SICK AND EMERGENCY CHILD CARE (1996)). One in
five workers reports having to provide care to a friend or relative age 50 or older. FUTUREWORK, supra
note 3, at 31.
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disrupt the operations of the employer, such as scheduling these activities
outside of work hours where possible. Because the vast majority of employers
surveyed reported that the FMLA had no noticeable effect on productivity,
profitability or growth, such minor expansions of the act should have negligible
impact on businesses.74 In addition, FRIP would expand the Act's definition of
family. A reasonable place to start would be with adoption of H.R. 2287,
which would allow family leave to care for a seriously ill domestic partner,
parent-in-law, adult child, sibling or grandparent.75  While this would not
capture all relationships that may be important to an employee, it would expand
protection to most persons for whom an employee may be responsible. As a
normative matter, a comprehensive program to insure family risks should
include the expansion of FMLA leave to all workers. Without further data on
the impact to small business of such a job-and-benefit-protected leave mandate,
however, this position has not been adopted in FRIP.
2. Private Employer Programs
Not all employees taking FMLA leave are uncompensated during their
absences. Both before and following passage of the Act, employers offered
various types of paid leave that employees could apply to absences taken for
such reasons. The FMLA recognized and encouraged these paid leave
policies,76 and the Department of Labor directly addressed the interaction of the
FMLA with these leave policies in its FMLA regulations.77 The regulations
provide that either the employee or the employer may substitute paid accrued
vacation, personal leave, or sick leave, for any otherwise unpaid FMLA leave,
78where the employer's policy would normally provide pay. Similarly, if the
employee meets the regular provisions of the employer's temporary disability
benefit or workers' compensation plans, the employee may receive payments
from those plans during the period of FMLA leave.79
This Section explores the use of employer-provided benefits as a means of
protecting workers' income from family risks. It examines the benefits
employers currently provide, as well as the feasibility of mandating that
employers expand these benefits to insure family risks.
74. BALANCING THE NEEDS OF FAMILIES AND EMPLOYERS, supra note 47, at 6-11 tbl.6.5
(demonstrating that 76.5% reported no effect on productivity, 87.6% reported no effect on profitability,
and 87.7% reported no effect on growth).
75. See supra note 66 and accompanying text.
76. See, e.g., 29 U.S.C. § 2653.
77. See, e.g., 29 C.F.R. § 825.207.
78. 29 C.F.R. § 825.207(c).
79. See, e.g., 29 C.F.R. § 825.207(d).
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a. Description of Employer-Provided Benefits
Almost no employers provide a benefit known as "paid family leave."
80
Instead, the employer-provided benefits that workers receive during periods of
leave fall under many different names. Of those individuals receiving pay
during family leave, 61.4% receive sick leave, 39.4% vacation pay, 25.7%
personal leave, 7.7% parental leave, 18% temporary disability insurance, and
11.4% receive income from other benefits.8 '
Employer-based benefits vary greatly across employing establishments.
Provision of such benefits is voluntary, and coverage is by no means universal.
The most prevalent benefit listed above is vacation, which is provided to 95%
of full-time employees at medium and large companies, 2 and 86% of workers
at small companies.8 3 Sick leave, which is the predominant source of income
during family leaves, is received by roughly half of employees, 4 most of whom
are allowed to apply it to family risks such as funerals, medical appointments,
personal business, or to care for a sick child. Short-term disability insurance
is less prevalent, and employees working for large employers are far more
86likely to receive this insurance than those working for small employers.
Fewer than one in five workers receive personal leave, and those who do
receive an average of three days per year.8 7  A growing trend amongst
80. Only two percent of private sector employers provide a benefit labeled as such. BUREAU OF
LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, NEWS RELEASE: EMPLOYEE BENEFITS IN MEDIUM AND
LARGE PRIVATE ESTABLISHMENTS 6 tbl.l. (1997), available at
http://www.bls.gov/ncs/ebs/sp/ebnrOOO5.pdf [hereinafter BENEFITS IN MEDIUM AND LARGE PRIVATE
ESTABLISHMENTS]; see also BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, NEWS RELEASE:
EMPLOYEE BENEFITS IN SMALL PRIVATE INDUSTRY ESTABLISHMENTS 7 tbl.1. (1996), available at
http://www.bls.gov/ncs/ebs/sp/ebnrOOO4.pdf [hereinafter BENEFITS IN SMALL PRIVATE INDUSTRY
ESTABLISHMENTS].
81. BALANCING THE NEEDS OF FAMILIES AND EMPLOYERS, supra note 47, at 4-6 tbl.4.5.
82. BENEFITS IN MEDIUM AND LARGE PRIVATE ESTABLISHMENTS, supra note 80, at 6 tbl. 1.
83. BENEFITS IN SMALL PRIVATE INDUSTRY ESTABLISHMENTS, supra note 80, at 7 tbl. 1. Small
employers were defined as those with fewer than 100 employees in this survey. Note that this includes
all non-FMLA-covered employers, but also covered employers that have between 50 and 99 employees.
84. BENEFITS IN MEDIUM AND LARGE PRIVATE ESTABLISHMENTS, supra note 80, at 6 tl.l
(showing that 56% of medium and large employers provide sick leave); BENEFITS IN SMALL PRIVATE
INDUSTRY ESTABLISHMENTS, supra note 80, at 7 tbl.l (showing that 50% of small employers provide
sick leave).
85. Seventy percent of those employees at medium and large companies are able to apply sick leave
to other family risks. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, BULLETIN 2517:
EMPLOYEE BENEFITS IN MEDIUM AND LARGE PRIVATE ESTABLISHMENTS 30 tbl. 31 (1997), available at
http://www.bls.gov/ncs/ebs/sp/ebblOOl7.pdf [hereinafter BULLETIN 2517]. Employees at small
companies have slightly more sick leave flexibility, as 73% are allowed to apply sick days to other types
of family risks. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, BULLETIN 2507: EMPLOYEE
BENEFITS IN SMALL PRIVATE INDUSTRY ESTABLISHMENTS 30 tbl. 27 (1996), available at
http://www.bls.gov/ncs/ebs/sp/sml96.pdf [hereinafter BULLETIN 2507].
86. Fifty-five percent of employees at medium and large establishments receive private short-term
disability insurance coverage. BENEFITS IN MEDIUM AND LARGE PRIVATE ESTABLISHMENTS, supra note
80, 6 tbl.1. Only 29% of employees at small establishments receive this benefit. BENEFITS IN SMALL
PRIVATE INDUSTRY ESTABLISHMENTS. supra note 80, at 7 tbl.1.
87. Twenty percent of employees at medium and large establishments receive personal leave for an
average of 3.5 days a year. BENEFITS IN MEDIUM AND LARGE PRIVATE ESTABLISHMENTS, supra note
2002)
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employers is to abandon the use of these separate paid leave accounts in favor
of a single bank of paid time off.88
The Commission on Family Leave found that 65.8% of leave-takers
received some wage replacement while out of work. 89 This apparently high
rate of wage replacement for FMLA absences is misleading, and it masks the
inability of existing employer-based benefits to provide income replacement
during extended periods of non-disability leave. The seemingly high rates of
wage replacement might be attributed to two phenomena: (1) more than half of
all leaves lasted ten days or less, which can be completely covered with sick
leave or vacation 90 and (2) the majority of leaves are taken for the employee's
own serious health condition. 91  If this analysis is correct, paid leave is
concentrated in these two areas, leaving workers who incur absences greater
than ten days for non-disability reasons most vulnerable to a loss of family
income. 92 This begs the question how to insure those family absences lasting
more than ten days or those incurred by workers not fortunate enough to have
employer-based benefits.
80, at 6 tbl. 1; BULLETIN 2517, supra note 85, at 22 tbl.20. Only 14% of workers at small establishments
receive personal leave for an average of three days a year. BENEFITS IN SMALL PRIVATE INDUSTRY
ESTABLISHMENTS, supra note 80, at 6 tbl.l; BULLETIN 2507, supra note 85, at, at 22 tbl.16.
88. Twenty-one percent of organizations in a 2000 survey provided this type of all-purpose leave
bank. CCH, 2000 CCH Unscheduled Absence Survey, http://hr.cch.com/press/releases/2000-
unscheduled-absence-survey.htm (last visited Apr. 20, 2002).
89. BALANCING THE NEEDS OF FAMILIES AND EMPLOYERS, supra note 47, at 4-5 tbl.4.4.
Approximately 72% of those respondents reported receipt of full wage replacement during their leave
period, and an additional 21.6% receive partial wage replacement. Id. at 4-6 tbl.4.6. An earlier study of
employees who work for employers not covered by the Act, however, revealed that they do not fare as
well. Only 32.6% of these employees receive full pay during periods of leave and 14.4% receive partial
wage replacement. U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, A WORKABLE BALANCE: REPORT TO CONGRESS ON FAMILY
AND MEDICAL LEAVE POLICIES 108, fig.5. II (1996) [hereinafter A WORKABLE BALANCE].
90. A WORKABLE BALANCE, supra note 89, at 97; BALANCING THE NEEDS OF FAMILIES AND
EMPLOYERS, supra note 47, at 2-4 fig.2.2 & tbl.2.2. The author believes the high level of workers with
full wage replacement exists because most family leaves are less than ten days in duration, and because
most workers can completely cover these absences with vacation and sick leave benefits. See supra
notes 82-84 and accompanying text. Even employees with only one year of service have almost enough
vacation days to cover a 10-day leave period. Employees of medium and large establishments average
9.6 days after one year, and 11.5 days with only three years of service. BULLETIN 2517, supra note 85,
at 21 tbl.1 9. Employees of small establishments average 8.1 days after one year of service and 10.2 days
after three years. BULLETIN 2507, supra note 85, at 21 tbl.15. Sick leave benefits have similar averages.
Employees of medium and large establishments average 11.2 sick days after the first year of service and
13 days after three years. BULLETIN 2517, supra note 85,, at 28 tbl.27. Employees of small
establishments average eight days after one year of service and 8.7 days after three years. BULLETIN
2507, supra note 85, at 27 tbl.23.
91. See BALANCING THE NEEDS OF FAMILIES AND EMPLOYERS, supra note 50. The author believes
the incidence of partial wage replacement can be primarily attributed to short-term disabilities. Between
14-22% of workers receive partial wage replacement during their entire absence. See supra note 89.
This number could be reached by multiplying the percentage of FMLA leave taken for illness (52%) by
the portion of employees receiving short term disability benefits (somewhere between the 29% for small
employers and 55% for large employers-probably around 42%).
92. BALANCING THE NEEDS OF FAMILIES AND EMPLOYERS, supra note 47, at 5-14 tbl.5.6 (showing
that less than 32% of employers provide full or partial pay in these non-disability circumstances).
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b. Proposals to Expand Employer-Provided Benefits
Research has not revealed any recent legislative proposals to mandate that
employers provide a comprehensive system of paid family leave, although
Congress considered and rejected such ideas during the creation of the Family
and Medical Leave Act. One type of leave benefit, however, has been singled
out as the focus of recent legislative mandates. In both Minnesota and
Washington, all employers providing sick leave benefits are required to allow
employees to use them to care for sick children.93 California passed a law in
1999 mandating that employers allow their employees to apply their own sick
leave to absences for family leave reasons.94 A similar bill was recently
considered in Hawaii.95
While they have not reached the legislative process, there have also been
proposals by academics suggesting that the government mandate employer-
based family risk insurance. Professor Selmi, for example, suggested requiring
employers to provide paid family leave to their employees as a condition of
96qualifying for certain government contracts. In an article written before the
passage of the FMLA, Professor Sugarman suggested replacing existing
mechanisms for wage replacement during disability, vacations, holidays or
unemployment with a new mandatory employee benefit that he called "Short
Term Paid Leave."97
c. Evaluating the Potential of Employer-Provided Benefits to Insure
Family Risks
While mandating that employers provide benefits to insure family risks
would certainly cover the target population - those who need to leave the work
force due to family reasons - this proposal is inappropriate for several reasons.
First, America has adopted a national policy of encouraging voluntary,
employer-provided benefits, and avoiding direct employer mandates. Congress
has considered employer benefit mandates on several occasions, and these
93. National Partnership for Women & Families, Letting Parents Use Sick Leave for Sick Kids, at
http://www.nationalpartnership.org/Content.cfm?LI=202&TypelD=l&NewsltemlD=276 (last visited
Mar. 22, 2002).
94. Kathleen Reagan, The 'Illusion' of Family Leave in New York, at
http://family.go.com/yourtime/money/featurelbappl 29famleave/bapp 129famleave.html (last visited
Mar. 22, 2002).
95. National Partnership for Women & Families, Hawaii, at
http://www.nationalpartnership.org/content.cfm?LI=8&L2=1 .0&GuidelD=5I &ArticlelD=7&CFID= 16
59499&CFTOKEN=34292403 (last updated July 25, 2001) (discussing S.B. 891 (2001)).
96. Selmi, supra note 23, at 776.
97. Under his proposed arrangement, employees would earn one day of paid leave for every five
days worked, and all absences between one day and six months would be compensated from this leave
bank. Employers would be required to accumulate these paid-leave days in an account that employees
could use on a relatively unrestricted basis. See Stephen D. Sugarman, Short Term Paid Leave: A New
Approach to Social Insurance and Employee Benefits, 75 CAL. L. REv. 465 (1987).
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proposals were rejected in every instance.98 Noting that this approach has been
rejected in important areas such as health insurance and pension coverage, it is
quite unlikely that Congress would mandate that employers provide direct
income replacement to workers facing family risks.
Employer mandates also pose troubling problems, because employers
rarely bear the full burden of the costs assigned to them. Economic theory
suggests that employers will pass the costs of direct mandates on to the
employee beneficiaries.9 9 Examinations of various employer mandates reveal
that employers largely succeed in this task.' 00
What is especially troubling about an employer mandate for paid family
leave is that the entire cost of this benefit is likely to be passed on only to those
who are expected to gain from it. In her framework for analyzing cost shifting
in employer mandates, Professor Jolls classifies family leave as an
"accommodation mandate," or one in which employers must "take special steps
in response to the distinctive needs of particular, identifiable demographic
groups of workers."'' Her framework predicts that a paid family leave benefit
would result in the costs being shifted to female workers, the apparent
beneficiaries of this mandate, because they are more likely to take time off for
family reasons. 102 If the full costs of a family leave benefit are imposed on the
employer (such as through mandated provision of pay or through perfectly
98. The most recent of these attempts was the Clinton Administration's Health Security Act of
1993 (HSA). H.R. 3600/S. 1757, 103d Cong. (1993) and S. 1775, 103d Cong. (1993). This bill
(commonly regarded as the "Clinton Administration Health Care Debacle") would have required
employers to purchase coverage for employees and their families, and to cover at least 80% of the
premium costs. Dana M Muir, From Yuppies to Guppies: Unfunded Mandates and Benefit Plan
Regulation, 34 GA. L. REv. 195, 235-36 (1999). The "best-known challenge to the voluntary pension
system" came from President Carter's 1979 President's Commission on Pension Policy. When the
commission issued its final report, it recommended a Minimum Universal Pension System (MUPS),
which would have required employers to contribute 3% of each employee's compensation each year to a
retirement plan. Id. at 213-214. Proposed legislation that contained many of the provisions developed
in the MUPS proposal was never enacted. Id. (referencing H.R. 3396, 97th Cong. (1981)).
99. For a general discussion of the wage and employment effects of employer mandates, see
Christine Jolls, Accommodation Mandates, 53 STAN. L. REV. 223 (2000) (distinguishing between the
effects of mandates that affect the employee population generally and those that benefit an identifiable
segment of the employee population); Lawrence H. Summers, Some Simple Economics of Mandated
Benefits, 79 AM. ECON. REv. 177 (1989) (outlining a framework for analyzing the effects of mandates
affecting the general employee population and concluding that the shift in costs is dependent on the
value of the mandate relative to its cost).
100. "This was the finding of Jonathan Gruber's study of the effects of state mandates requiring the
coverage of childbirth expenses in employer-provided insurance." Selmi, supra note 23, at 780 n.267
(citing Jonathan Gruber, The Incidence of Mandated Maternity Benefits, 84 AM. ECON. REv. 622, 639
(1994)). "Economists generally agree that both the employers' and the employees' shares of social
security taxes are borne by employees in the form of reduced wages." Michael J. Graetz, The Troubled
Marriage of Retirement Security and Tax Policies, 135 U. PA. L. REv. 851, 867 (1987). Jonathan
Gruber & Alan Krueger estimate that workers bear 85% of the cost of workers' compensation insurance.
Selmi, supra note 23, at 780 n.268 (citing Jonathan Gruber & Alan Krueger, The Incidence of Mandated
Employer-Provided Insurance: Lessons from Workers' Compensation Insurance, in TAX POLICY AND
THE ECONOMY 111, 112 (David Bradford ed., 1991)).
101. Jolls, supra note 99, at 231.
102. ld at 290.
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experience-rated social insurance), the employer will pass the costs directly
onto female employees in the form of lower wages.
10 3
An extension of Jolls' analysis suggests that employer contributions will
reach the intended beneficiaries only if they are mandated through a non-
experience-rated social insurance framework. A scheme that taxed employers
and redistributed benefits to workers with family risks would predictably result
in lower real wages for all employees due to cost shifting. The decrease in
wages, however, would be borne by all workers equally. This would be true
because employers would not be able to affect their costs by discriminating
against the beneficiaries - an employer's payroll taxes would be the same
regardless of which workers it employed.104 A tax-and-transfer form of social
insurance would have less detrimental effects on the intended beneficiaries'
wages than would private employer-based insurance, and could achieve
redistribution to those workers experiencing family risks.
An additional concern attending an employer insurance mandate would be
its impact on small employers. These employers are less likely than their larger
counterparts to offer such insurance today, and may not be able to afford the
costs of wage replacement if several employees collected benefits
simultaneously. Small employers would likely require assistance in providing
such insurance, such as by providing government subsidies or risk pooling
mechanisms. 0 5
Perhaps the most fundamental problem with an employer mandate is the
question of who should bear this risk. Some suggest that employers should
bear the costs, since they receive the benefits of increased employee morale,
productivity and retention when workers have income security.'06 Others argue
that while paid family leave may be desirable, it is inappropriate to make
103. Id. at 291.
104. In other words, if the employer has to pay more as employees use the benefit, it will avoid
hiring those employees (or will lower the wages of those employees) whom it believes will receive those
benefits. If the employer pays the same regardless of the composition of its work force, there will be no
incentive to discriminate against employees receiving the benefit.
105. Of a parallel situation in mandated employer-based health insurance, Professor Graetz
explains, "[An employer mandate would raise the costs of hiring and retaining workers most for small
business and thus would almost certainly be accompanied by some new subsidies for small or marginal
businesses-additional charges on the Treasury that seem unlikely either to be well-targeted or
equitable." Michael J. Graetz, Universal Coverage Without an Employer Mandate, DOMESTIC AFF.79,
92 (Winter 1993/94).
106. See, e.g., NATIONAL PARTNERSHIP FOR WOMEN & FAMILIES, COMMENTS ON DEPARTMENT OF
LABOR'S PROPOSED RULE ON BIRTH AND ADOPTION UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION,
http://www.nationalpartnership.org/content.cfm?LI=8&L2=1 .0&GuidelD=54&ArticlelD=3; Questions
& Answers, supra note 57. Employers experience a decrease in turnover when paid leave benefits are
provided, allowing companies to retain trained and experienced workers, and decreasing permanent
search and replacement costs. See infra note 168 and accompanying text. There is also growing
recognition that family leave benefits increase worker productivity and morale. See National
Partnership for Women & Families, Introduction: The FMLA Helps Millions of American Work
Families- Without Hurting Employers
http://www.nationalpartnership.org/content.cfm?L =8&L2= 1.0&GuidelD=9&ArticlelD=1&CFID=1 65
9499&CFTOKEN=34292403 (last visited Mar. 22, 2002).
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employers bear the Costs. 10 7  The position taken in FRIP is that employers
already bear a decent share of the risk in the form of the costs of replacing
absent workers. While the Proposal would impose some incremental costs on
employers, it would not require them to bear the risk alone. Instead, because
family risk insurance would impart benefits to employees, employers, and
society in general, 10 8 the costs would be shared among all three.
3. Private Insurance Market
Another possibility for insuring family risks is to provide protection within
the private insurance market. Individual policies are used to insure many other
risks that workers face, such as damage to a home or a motor vehicle. This
Section briefly explores the possibility of insuring family risks in this same
manner.
a. Description of the Private Insurance Market
Private insurance is a mechanism that allows individuals to pool their risks.
Individuals in the pool pay premiums expected to cover the insurer's costs of
payments due to the occurrence of the insured event. In a private insurance
107. See, e.g., Strategic Services on Unemployment & Workers' Compensation (UWC), UWC
Press Releases: June 28, 2000 - UWC Provides Legal Strategy for Joint Lawsuit Against Clinton
Administration, available at http://www.uwcstrategy.org/PressReleases/body_062800.html (quoting
Eric Oxfeld as saying, "[T]he issue is not whether paid family and medical leave is desirable. Rather,
whether it's appropriate to use the unemployment insurance system to compensate workers who take a
leave of absence from work."). William Vernon, Massachusetts director of National Federation of
Independent Business (NFIB), Washington, DC, agrees with Oxfeld. He states, "Any new social
program that promises new benefits for families with young children should be paid by general tax
revenues, not by a small number of the state's employers." Strategic Services on Unemployment &
Workers' Compensation (UWC), UWC Press Releases: June 26, 2000 - Massachusetts State Task Force
asks Strategic Services on Unemployment & Workers' Compensation (UWC) for Expert Testimony on
Unemployment Insurance Policy, available at
http://www.uwcstrategy.orgPressReleases/body_062600.html.
108. Babies' development hinges on a strong attachment to their parents. During the first few
months after birth, babies' brain cell connections increase twenty-fold, and infants exposed to
stimulating settings experience improvement in brain function that is both long-lasting and cumulative,
having positive effects for the future labor force and economy. There is evidence that hospitalized
children recover more quickly and suffer fewer complications when their parents are at their side, thus
reducing the costs of medical treatment and insurance premiums. There is also evidence that parents
with income available during leave are 5.2 times as likely to care for their sick children themselves,
which prevents spread of communicable diseases to other children at schools or daycares. The care that
American workers provide to elderly relatives, if replaced by paid workers, would have an economic
cost of roughly S196 billion, much of which would likely be provided by public programs like Medicaid.
In the absence of paid leave, workers suffering from serious health conditions or pregnancy frequently
have to shorten their leaves, with grave consequences for their health. Premature return to work leads
not only to reduced productivity, but also increased need for later medical interventions. See, e.g.,
NATIONAL PARTNERSHIP FOR WOMEN & FAMILIES, COMMENTS ON DEPARTMENT OF LABOR'S
PROPOSED RULE ON BIRTH AND ADOPTION UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION, supra note 106 (citations
omitted).
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contract, the level of insurance is a function of two variables. 10 9 The first is the
purchaser's desire for security."t 0 A purchaser who desires greater protection
from the risks will purchase a higher level of insurance (in this case, a higher
wage-replacement rate). The second variable is the insurance company's
concern about "adverse selection" and "moral hazard.""' If an insurer believes
that adverse selection is a problem in the market (that only individuals
expecting to experience the insured event will purchase insurance), the insurer
will set premiums at high levels, in order to cover its expected payments and
administrative costs. Where the risk pool is adversely selected, there is little
incentive to purchase insurance because the premium costs will be so high that
individuals are better off trying to self-insure or gambling on the risk. Thus, no
one will join the insurance pool and the market will experience failure. Moral
hazard problems ("the likelihood that 'full compensation' might make the
insured indifferent about whether the risk occurs")" 12 can have similar
implications for insurance markets. Where the presence of insurance makes the
event more likely to occur,1 13 reimbursement levels have to be set at
sufficiently low levels to make the event unattractive and dissuade unnecessary
claims. Alternatively, premiums will have to be set high enough to cover the
added costs due to moral hazard. In either event, many individuals will be
priced out of the insurance market, and as a result, the market might even fail to
exist.
b. Proposals to Expand the Private Insurance Market
The Campaign for Family Leave Benefits, a project of the National
Partnership for Women & Families, is investigating numerous methods for
insuring family risks. One of the options they list as "under consideration" is
the development of family leave insurance for the private market. While this
approach has not been suggested by any legislative bodies, a brief evaluation of
its potential for insuring family risks follows.
c. Evaluating the Private Market's Potential to Insure Family Risks
Private insurance policies for family risks are virtually unheard of. Such
policies do exist, however, for at least one type of family risk-the worker's
own temporary disability. While most temporary disability policies are





113. Such is the case with family risks. Eighty-eight percent of workers reported that if wage
replacement were available they would have taken more family leave. See supra note 53 and
accompanying text.
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purchased as group plans by employers, they are also available for purchase by
individuals. The adverse selection and moral hazard considerations, however,
have resulted in individual policies providing low reimbursement levels and
charging hefty premiums, and this subset of family risks has already
experienced some degree of market failure.' 
1 4
An examination of the temporary disability insurance market reveals why
private family risk insurance is infeasible. First, as disabilities account for
approximately 60% of all leaves taken under the Family and Medical Leave
Act, disability insurance is a key component of family risk insurance. Second,
disability, like family risk, is an area where the insured persons have much
better information about their risks than do insurers." 5
Private insurers are skeptical of anyone requesting to buy an individual
disability insurance policy and assume that such individuals have a high risk of
becoming disabled. 116 Accordingly, they charge an appropriate, steep
premium, pricing most individuals out of the market." 17 Adverse selection is so
prominent in the disability insurance market that there is virtually no market for
individual policies,118 and insurers who have attempted to write individual
disability policies have often had disastrous experiences."19 Moral hazard is
also a difficult issue for private disability insurance, because workers are "more
likely to find reasons to stop working if the cost of doing so is cushioned by
replacement of most of their wages.'"' 20  While workers will not become
seriously disabled simply to collect insurance, disability is heterogeneous and
has varying effects on workers' ability to participate in the labor force.' 2' It is
often difficult to determine to what extent malingering, as opposed to limitation
of the disability itself, exacerbates the lost labor income. Family risks would
have similar moral hazard considerations. To protect themselves from moral
hazard, insurers typically provide meager replacement rates for disability
policies 122 in an effort to leave some of the burden on the insured and to
increase incentives to return to work. This combination of high price and low
replacement rates has made private disability insurance unattractive and the
market for individual policies very small. These same moral hazard and
adverse selection considerations likely explain why there is currently no market
for private family risk insurance.
In order to make family risk insurance available to substantially all
working families, it would be necessary to force both high- and low-risk




118. Id. at 212.
119. Id. at 71.
120. Id. at 70.
121. Id. at71.
122. Id. at 81.
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individuals into a common pool. Similarly, in order to provide socially
adequate replacement rates for low-wage workers, without having similarly
high replacement rates that would attract too many high-wage workers out of
the work force, there must also be redistribution in the benefits scale. 123 These
functions belong uniquely to the domain of social insurance.'
24
B. Social Insurance
Winston Churchill once commented that social insurance systems bring
"the magic of averages to the rescue of millions."'125 Professors Graetz and
Mashaw describe social insurance as "dependent on government action,
directed at a particular class of risks and designed to pursue societal purposes
that could not or would not be achieved through individual contracting in
private insurance markets.' 26  As discussed in the previous Section, family
risks fit neatly within this description. There is no market for private family
risk insurance, with the exception of disability, where adverse selection and
moral hazard have made the purchase of individual policies impracticable.
Social insurance is designed explicitly to counteract these market limitations of
private insurance contracts.' 
27
Graetz and Mashaw explain that: "The distinctive risk that social insurance
addresses the risk of inadequate labor income."'128 Society's willingness to pay
for social insurance depends, however, both on what it can afford and, "more
fundamentally, on how it draws the line between collective and individual or
family responsibility."' 29 Society's tastes for social insurance change over time
as economic and social circumstances change, and demographic shifts and
changes in work and family circumstances affect people's needs for social
insurance protections.' In light of the demographic changes discussed in
earlier portions of this Article, and the flurry of legislative activity concerning
ways to respond to families' needs for wage replacement, it appears that
American society may now be ready to assume some responsibility for family
risks.
123. See id. at 71-72. Private insurance policies could be incorporated into a system of social
insurance, for example, if a mandate to purchase a policy were placed on individuals and accompanied
by tax credits or vouchers. See Graetz, supra note 105, at 102.
124. Id.
125. STEVE IDEMOTO, ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITY INSTITUTE, Family Leave Insurance: A Proposal
for Washington Workers, at http://www.econop.com/FLI-PolicyBrief2000-PragmaticSolutions.htm (last
visited Mar 26, 2002) (citing PETER A. CORNING, SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, THE
EVOLUTION OF MEDICARE... FROM IDEA TO LAW (1969)).
126. GRAETZ & MASHAW, supra note 111, at 26.
127. Id. at 43 ("It provides insurance for people who could not otherwise afford it and in markets
where moral hazard and adverse selection make private insurance unavailable or of limited value.")
128. Id. at 27. Families live almost exclusively by labor income, and therefore demand protection
against circumstances that take them out of the workforce and cut off this income. Id. at 47.
129. Id. at 43-44.
130. Id. at 42.
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The following sections describe the various social insurance options for
family risks, the recent proposals associated with each of those options, and an
evaluation of how each option might be used as part of a national family policy.
More specifically, it explains how each system would be incorporated into the
Family Risk Insurance Proposal.
1. Unemployment Insurance
The first social insurance option for family risks, and the one receiving the
most attention, is an expansion of the existing system of Unemployment
Insurance. This Section of the Article describes the current UI system and the
ways in which it already insures family risks. It discusses the Department of
Labor's BAA-UC regulations, the surrounding controversy, and the states'
responses. It then explores the many reasons why UI is not the best system for
insuring family risks generally, but recommends several changes that would
allow it to better serve working families. Because using the UI system to
insure family risks is the proposal that has received the most attention
nationally, it also receives the most attention in this Article.
a. Description of UI System
The Unemployment Insurance system began in 1935 during the Great
Depression and New Deal eras. It was created as a federal/state partnership and
has remained so for over sixty-five years.' 3' This division of responsibility is
rooted in federal UI laws: the Social Security Act and the part of the U.S.
Internal Revenue Code known as the Federal Unemployment Tax Act
(FUTA).
132
131. Both the federal and state governments have important responsibilities for unemployment
compensation. Federal involvement is limited to three primary responsibilities: (1) control over taxes
collected under state and federal unemployment laws; (2) financing administrative costs and controlling
administrative practices; and (3) establishing minimum program standards where nationwide uniformity
is essential. States must comply with such standards in order to remain eligible for tax offsets and
administrative grants. States are responsible for establishing and maintaining unemployment insurance
programs that meet federal requirements. UI is primarily administered pursuant to state law, and most
substantive provisions are a state responsibility. Each state law prescribes its own tax structure,
qualifying requirements, benefit levels, and disqualification provisions. See NATIONAL FOUNDATION
FOR UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION & WORKERS' COMPENSATION, HIGHLIGHTS OF FEDERAL
UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION LAWS 1 (Jan. 1997) [hereinafter HIGHLIGHTS OF FEDERAL UI LAWS].
132. The Social Security Act requirements are codified at 42 U.S.C. § 301 and the Internal Revenue
Code requirements are codified at 26 U.S.C. §§ 3301-3311. The Federal Unemployment Tax Act
(FUTA) was designed to encourage the creation of state systems for unemployment insurance by using a
tax-offset approach. Frey, supra note 31, at 184 (footnote omitted). It imposes a payroll tax on most
employers, but allows an offset against the federal tax to those employers paying taxes under an
approved state unemployment compensation law. See STRATEGIC SERVICES ON UNEMPLOYMENT &
WORKERS' COMPENSATION, HIGHLIGHTS OF STATE UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION LAWS 1 (2000)
[hereinafter HIGHLIGHTS OF STATE UI LAWS].
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The U! system has multifarious purposes.' 33  "Its principal purpose is to
assist the unemployed worker in maintaining an adequate standard of living
during periods of involuntary unemployment,"' 34 thus providing economic
relief to workers "unemployed through no fault of their own"'' 35 while they
search for suitable employment. Other purposes include improving people-
power utilization, stabilizing the supply of labor, and encouraging the
stabilization of the economy.1
36
UI is funded almost exclusively by a payroll tax imposed on employers.'
37
Each employer is assigned a tax rate based on its annual payroll and history of
unemployment among its workers-a practice known as "experience rating."
Thus, the number of successful claims against it in the past directly influences
an employer's current costs. t38  This requirement is intended to provide an
incentive for employers to stabilize employment.
In every state, unemployed individuals must file claims with the state
employment agency in order to receive benefits. The employment agency
makes several determinations, beginning with a determination on whether the
applicant is covered by the state's system and meets the qualifying
requirements. 39  The objective of the qualifying requirement is to grant
benefits only to those individuals who have demonstrated attachment to the
labor force.' 40  The tests include earnings requirements' 4' and assessments to
ensure that the applicant is without a job, involuntarily unemployed, 42 and able
133. Frey, supra note 31, at 185 (footnote omitted).
134. Id. at 185 (footnote omitted).
135. Thompson, supra note 6, at 759.
136. See Frey, supra note 31, at 185 (footnote omitted).
137. "Alaska and New Jersey also tax employees, and Pennsylvania and West Virginia require
employee contributions under certain circumstances." Most employers are subject to a federal tax
imposed by FUTA, which is equal to 6.2% of the first $7,000 in wages paid to each employee. FUTA
credits employers for up to 5.4% for any taxes paid under state UI laws. The net tax (0.8%) is collected
by the federal government and used to finance administrative costs, the federal portion of extended UI
benefits, and a loan fund for states that exhaust their UI funds. See HIGHLIGHTS OF STATE UI LAWS,
supra note 132, at 2. Any covered employer not subject to state law would be liable for the full federal
tax without an offset, and no unemployment insurance protection would be available to its employees.
See HIGHLIGHTS OF FEDERAL UI LAWS, supra note 131, at 4. In response to such strong incentives, all
states operate compliant UI systems. The Department of Labor is responsible for reviewing state
programs to ensure they meet all federal requirements. See HIGHLIGHTS OF STATE UI LAWS, supra note
132, at 1.
138. Frey, supra note 31, at 185 (footnote omitted).
139. Id. at 186 (footnote omitted).
140. HIGHLIGHTS OF STATE UI LAWS, supra note 132, at 2.
141. The earnings requirement comes in many varieties. Some states require a specified number of
weeks of work in which the claimant earned at least a minimum amount. Others express it as a multiple
of the quarter in which the claimant's earnings were the highest. In other states, the qualifying
requirement is a multiple of the claimant's weekly benefit amount. See id.
142. To ensure that the applicant is involuntarily without a job, states disqualify those workers who
voluntarily quit without good cause, who are discharged for misconduct, or who refuse an offer of
suitable work without good cause. The definitions of key terms such as "good cause," "misconduct,"
and "suitable work" vary across jurisdictions. See id. at 3. Some states have limited "good cause" to
situations that are related to the work or attributable to the employer. Frey, supra note 31, at 186
(footnote omitted).
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and available for work. 14 3 "If the applicant is covered and eligible, the agency
computes the amount and duration of the weekly benefit amount." 144 Benefits
are typically based on a percentage of prior earnings and paid for up to twenty-
six weeks.
While the UI system is not designed to provide family risk insurance, some
states have granted exceptions to the qualifying requirements for employees
who leave work for family-related reasons. Exceptions include excusal of
voluntary quits, refusals of otherwise suitable work, and exceptions to the "able
and available" and "seeking work" requirements.
The first exception is an exemption for employees leaving work
voluntarily, but with "good cause." Approximately two-thirds of states specify
that "good cause" must be "connected with work" or "attributable to the
employer."' 145 The remainder, however, utilize a variety of exceptions that may
encompass family reasons. The broadest exception grants "good cause" for
employees leaving for personal reasons that are "compelling and
necessitous." 146  Several states employ more specific good cause exceptions.
These include forgiving quits in order to relocate with a spouse147 or those
necessitated by lack of childcare. 148 There is a recent trend among states to
exempt quits in situations involving domestic violence. 149 A handful of states
143. In all states, claimants must be able to work and available for suitable work. In most states,
claimants must also register for work with the employment service and be actively seeking work. See
HIGHLIGHTS OF STATE UI LAWS, supra note 132, at 3.
144. Frey, supra note 31, at 186 (footnote omitted).
145. National Association of Child Advocates, Issue Brief Unemployment Insurance For Low-
Income Families: New Challenges for Child Advocates, July 1998, available at
http://www.childadvocacy.org/unemplyl.htm.
146. Some states with such an exception are Arizona, Arkansas, Colorado, Massachusetts,
Maryland, Pennsylvania, Virginia, Kansas, Utah, Iowa, (and also Texas and Washington if reason was
work-related). See HIGHLIGHTS OF STATE UI LAWS, supra note 132, at 70-71 nn.4 & 9; National
Association of Child Advocates, States Which Provide Unemployment Insurance Coverage for
Voluntary Terminations Caused by Domestic Circumstances and Dependent Allowances, at
http://www.childadvocacy.org/unemply2.htm (last visited Mar. 22, 2002).
147. California, Indiana, Kansas have such an exception. See U.S. Dep't. Labor, UI Law Tables §
430, available at http://www.ows.doleta.gov/unemploy/uilawstable.asp (last visited Mar. 22, 2002)
[hereinafter DOL U1 Law Tables]. Oklahoma added such an exception in 1998. Diana Runner,
Changes in unemployment insurance legislation in 1998. MONTHLY LAB. REv., Jan. 1999, at 20, 26.
Washington state offers the exception only if the transfer is employer-mandated. See Robert Kenyon, Jr.
& Loryn Lancaster, Changes in unemployment insurance legislation in 2000, MONTHLY LAB. REV., Jan.
2001, at 29, 34. Maine also offers the exception if the claimant can show attachment to new labor
market within 14 days. HIGHLIGHTS OF STATE UI LAWS, supra note 132, at 70-71 n.4.
148. Arizona and California have good cause exceptions for quits necessitated by lack of childcare.
National Association of Child Advocates, supra note 145. North Carolina added this exception in 1999.
See Robert Kenyon, Jr., Changes in unemployment insurance legislation in 1999, MONTHLY LAB. REV.,
Jan. 2000, at 27, 31. Connecticut has a similar exception in cases where the employee's hours of work
were changed. See CONN. GEN. STAT. § 31-236(a)(2)(A)(iv), CONN. AGENCIES REGS.§ 31-236-21.
Wisconsin recognizes the exception where a shift reassignment precludes child care. See HIGHLIGHTS
OF STATE UI LAWS, supra note 132, at 71 n.4.
149. California, Maine, New Hampshire, Colorado, Connecticut, New York, North Carolina,
Wisconsin, and Wyoming offer this exception. DOL UI Law Tables, supra note 147, at § 430.01;
HIGHLIGHTS OF STATE UI LAWS, supra note 132, at 72 n. 18; Kenyon, supra note 148, at 35. Delaware,
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provide good cause exceptions if employment was left in order to tend to an
illness in the immediate family,1 50 and several other states allow the exceptions
if the claimant left employment due to his or her own illness.15 1  These illness
exceptions, however, have limited impact. If the claimant left work because of
illness, the claimant may not be "able and available" to work, which would
result in a benefit denial during the period of incapacitation. 152 Quits because
of pregnancy are treated in much the same manner.153 Thirteen states provide
benefits for employee-initiated, pregnancy-related separations, 5 4 and the most
common approach among these states is to provide UI benefits only after
childbirth, once the mother is ready to reenter the work force.
155
A second category includes exceptions to the "able and available" and
"seeking work" requirements. Many of these exceptions focus on the
claimant's own illness. In at least eleven states, claimants are eligible for UI if
Nebraska, New Jersey, and Rhode Island just added the exception in the year 2000. See Kenyon &
Lancaster, supra note 147, at 29.
150. Colorado, Connecticut, Illinois, Iowa, Wisconsin, Maryland, Washington, Maine, and New
York offer this exception. DOL U! Law Tables, supra note 147, at tbl.401.1 n.4; National Association
of Child Advocates, supra note 146. Similarly, Oklahoma and Texas allow the exception to care for
minor children with an illness. DOL UILaw Tables, supra note 147, at tbl.401.1 n.4; see Runner, supra
note 147, at 26. In most of these states, the claimant is required to make all reasonable efforts to
preserve the employment before being eligible for the exception. See DOL UI Law Tables, supra note
147, at § 430.
151. There are many variations of the personal illness exception. Generally, Oklahoma, Wyoming,
Colorado, Maryland, Maine, Ohio, South Dakota, West Virginia, Connecticut, and Illinois have
exceptions for bona fide medical reason involving the claimant's health or if continued working presents
a health hazard. See DOL U! Law Tables, supra note 147, at tbl.401.1 n.4.; HIGHLIGHTS OF STATE UI
LAWS, supra note 132, at 70-71 nn.4-9; National Association of Child Advocates, supra note 146. In
Kansas and Montana, the exception applies if the claimant left work under advice of a practicing health
care provider, and after recovery, offered to return to work but regular or comparable work was not
available. DOL UI Law Tables, supra note 147, at tbl.401.1 n.4.; HIGHLIGHTS OF STATE UI LAWS,
supra note 132, at 71 n.4. New Hampshire's exception applies if the claimant left work due to personal
illness, accidental injury or pregnancy, the absence was one year or less in duration, the
employee/employer relationship was maintained, and a physician released the employee to return to
work but no suitable work was available. HIGHLIGHTS OF STATE UI LAWS, supra note 132, at 71 n.6.
In North Dakota, the exception is granted if the employee fumishes a written note from a physician,
notifies the employer of the physician's requirement, and is capable and offers to return to work within
sixty days of the last day of work. DOL U! Law Tables, supra note 147, at tbl 401.1 n.4. In Texas, the
exception applies if the claimant left work due to his or her medically verified illness, injury, disability
or pregnancy while claimant is still available for work. HIGHLIGHTS OF STATE UI LAWS, supra note
132, at 71 n.4. In Vermont, the disqualification lasts for only the first one to six weeks if health
problems preclude the discharge of the duties of the work left. DOL U! Law Tables, supra note 147, at
tbl.401 n.10.
152. DOL UI Law Tables, supra note 147, at § 430.04.
153. FUTA's § 3304(a)(12) forbids states from denying benefits based solely on pregnancy, but
allows them to treat pregnancy like any other temporary disability. Mark R. Brown, Part I.
Unemployment Compensation and Eligibility: A Case for Pregnancy-Based Unemployment Insurance,
29 U. MICH. J.L. REFORm 41, 42.
154. These states include Alabama, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Iowa, Kentucky,
Massachusetts, Missouri, North Carolina, New York, Pennsylvania, Tennessee, and Texas. See id. at 47
n.27.
155. Id. at 50. Missouri, for example, has a special rule for pregnancy, which grants the exception
if the claimant worked for the employer for at least one year and offers to return to work within ninety
days of terminating the pregnancy. HIGHLIGHTS OF STATE UI LAWS, supra note 132, at 71 n.8.
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they are unavailable because of their own illness or disability, which occurs
after filing the claim and registering for work, as long as no offer of work that
would have been suitable at the time of registration is refused. 156 A few states
allow exceptions for funeral and bereavement leave,' 57 and some have a general
exception for compelling personal circumstances.
158
A third category of exceptions for family circumstances centers on the
requirement that claimants accept any offer of "suitable" work. At least four
states have exceptions for refusals if the position offered would interfere with
care for family members, but most of these exceptions apply only if the
position was on the third shift. 159  A few other states have more general
suitability exceptions for family circumstances.1
60
b. Proposals to Expand UI
The dominant proposal for insuring family risks is to expand the UI system
to provide income replacement benefits for employees on family leave. This
proposal is attractive primarily because it would utilize already-existing
agencies for administration, its eligibility rules can be used to demonstrate
work force attachment, and because many state Ul trust funds have recently
enjoyed surpluses that might be used to fund such benefits.
Because of these factors, insuring family risks through UI is the approach
advocated by the Department of Labor (DOL) and under consideration by
several states. This issue has garnered a great deal of attention since the DOL
released its Birth and Adoption Unemployment Compensation (BAA-UC)
regulations in 2000.161 The BAA-UC regulations 62 allow states to develop
156. States adopting this rule include Alaska, Delaware, Hawaii, Idaho, Maine, Maryland,
Massachusetts, Montana, Nevada, Tennessee, and Vermont. DOL U! Law Tables, supra note 147, at
tbl.400.
157. These states include California (four days), Arizona (four days), New Jersey (two days) and
Alaska (seven days). Id. at tbl.400 n.3 and § 410.
158. Idaho offers the exemption if the labor market withdrawal was for less than the major part of
week, as does Arkansas if withdrawal was for less than four days. Id. at tbl.400 n.3.
159. Exceptions apply to workers who refuse work on the third shift in Maine if the refusal is due
to family obligations, in Massachusetts if the claimant is female, and in New Hampshire if the claimant
is the only adult available during these hours to care for children under age fifteen or for an ill or infirm
elderly person who is dependent on the claimant. North Carolina has an exception for undue family
hardship when the individual is unable to obtain adequate child or elder care. Id. at § 440.01.
160. For example, in Utah the claimant is not disqualified if it would be contrary to equity and good
conscience. In Maine, if the refusal was for a necessary and compelling reason, disqualification
terminates when the claimant is again able and available for work. Id. at tbl.404 n.8.
161. The impetus for the regulations began several years ago when four states requested
confirmation from the Clinton Administration that they could provide family leave benefits through their
UI systems without violating FUTA. National Partnership for Women & Families, supra note 57. On
May 23, 1999, President Clinton announced his intention to make parental leave more affordable in a
commencement speech at Grambling State University. FMLA Technical Corrections Coalition, supra
note 1. The following day, he issued an Executive Memorandum directing the Secretary of Labor to
issue regulations permitting employees to collect UI while on FMLA leave. See Executive
Memorandum (May 24, 1999), available at http://saveui.org/execmemo.html. By December 3, 1999,
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methods for paying UI to "parents on approved leave or who otherwise leave
employment to be with their newborns or newly-adopted children., 163  The
regulations specify that biological parents, legal parents, or those with custody
of a child pending adoption may be eligible for such compensation,' 64 and that
parents may utilize this benefit within the one-year period commencing with
birth or placement. 165 Parents need not be covered by the FMLA to be eligible
for BAA-UC. 66 The regulations apply only to birth or placement, and do not
allow states to use UI to insure other categories of FMLA leave. 67 The DOL
touts BAA-UC as an "experiment," that "will test whether enabling these
parents to have this time to be with their newborns and newly-adopted children
by providing them with partial wage replacement will promote their long-term
attachment to the work force. 1 68  The agency takes the position that the
regulation does not change federal UI requirements, and that it is merely using
its interpretive powers to construe the federal "able and available" requirements
to include an exception for experimental BAA-UC.
169
The DOL also makes several recommendations to state legislatures through
its Model State Legislation. The agency recommends that BAA-UC be limited
to twelve weeks' duration, that benefits count toward the maximum number of
weeks of UI eligibility, that other income replacement be deducted from
the Department of Labor issued a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM) for its proposed rule on
BAA-UC. In response, a "broad-based business group, led by the President of Strategic Services on
Unemployment and Workers' Compensation (UWC) and the Executive Director of the National FMLA
Technical Corrections Coalition (a group launched by the Society for Human Resource Management
(SHRM)) immediately created a national campaign against the proposal." SHRM, Business Coalition
Launches National Campaign to Stop the Raiding of Unemployment Fund for Family Leave (Nov. 30,
1999), at http://www.shrm.org/press/releases/991130.htm. The lobbying coalition, known as The Ut
Working Group, maintains a website at http://www.saveui.org opposing the regulations. Despite
resistance, the DOL published the final BAA-UC regulations in the Federal Register on June 13, 2000.
On June 26, 2000, SHRM, LPA and others filed a lawsuit in the D.C. district court asking to invalidate
the regulations as an arbitrary agency action. See SHRM, SHRMDenounces Clinton's New Paid Family
Leave Rule by Announcing Historic Lawsuit (June 12, 2000), at
http://www.shrm.org/press/releases/000612.htm; SHRM, SHRM to Sue DOL over "Baby/U!" Rule
(June 26, 2000), at http://www.shrm.org/hmews/articles/062600.htm.
162. Regulations for Birth and Adoption Unemployment Compensation, 65 Fed. Reg. 37,209
(2000) (to be codified at 20 C.F.R. pt. 604).
163. Id. at 37,223 (to be codified at20 C.F.R. § 604.1).
164. See id. at 37,224 (to be codified at 20 C.F.R. § 604.3(0).
165. See id. (to be codified at 20 C.F.R. § 604.2 1).
166. See id. at 37,212.
167. See id. at 37,225.
168. Id. at 37,210. The bipartisan Commission on Family Leave found that nearly 84% of all
employees taking FMLA leave return to their jobs, and that work force attachment increases if benefits
are paid. 94% of workers whose leave was fully paid returned to their same employer, as compared with
only 77% of those whose leaves were unpaid. See A WORKABLE BALANCE, supra note 89, at 114.
169. See Regulations for Birth and Adoption Unemployment Compensation, supra note 162, at
37,224 (to be codified at 20 C.F.R. § 604.10). The DOL notes that there are no explicit "able and
available" requirements stated in federal law, and that the requirement is a creature of regulatory
interpretation. Id. at 37,210. The Department also notes that it has used its interpretive powers to create
other exceptions to the "able and available" rule, in areas such as job training, illness, jury duty, and
temporary layoffs. Id. at 37,211.
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benefits, and that the benefits be exempted from experience rating. 7 ' The
DOL does not require that employees return to work to be eligible for benefits,
although states may recover benefits if parents do not return to work.1
71
The issuance of the BAA-UC regulations sparked heated debate over the
propriety of using UI for this purpose. 172  The debate has culminated in the
filing of a lawsuit by several business-based organizations against the DOL,
challenging the regulations' legality.
173
Despite this legal challenge, numerous states have bills pending that would
capitalize on the BAA-UC regulation and utilize the UI system to insure family
risks. The very existence of the regulations is important to states considering
using UI for family risk insurance. If states had amended their UI statutes to
provide leave without the regulations, they would run the risk that that the DOL
would deem their statute noncompliant with FUTA, which could in turn subject
170. See id. at 37,225.
171. See id. at 37,226.
172. Proponents argue that the rule will promote and update the goals of the UI system and that the
regulations advance the current goals by increasing work force attachment. Proponents also argue that
the regulations are necessary because current FMLA protections are inadequate. Proponents contend
that the program's costs can be offset with UI fund surpluses and the considerable savings that will
accrue to other social insurance programs, such as welfare, food stamps, Medicaid and other public
programs that support workers leaving employment for family reasons, because fewer workers would
apply for public assistance. They also cite savings from reduced job search and UI costs after the
employee is ready to return to work again, if the worker preserves attachment to the previous employer.
The main threat to the solvency of UI funds is not BAA-UC, they argue, but the dramatic employer tax
cuts that have been returning these funds to employers. See, e.g., NATIONAL PARTNERSHIP FOR WOMEN
& FAMILIES, COMMENTS ON DEPARTMENT OF LABOR'S PROPOSED RULE ON BIRTH AND ADOPTION
UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION, supra note 106.
The regulations' opponents begin with an assertion that UI and family leave have different and
incompatible purposes. Furthermore, they argue, funding family leaves should not be an employer
obligation. Whereas the UI system is designed to discourage employers from making poor use of the
labor supply, employers have no ability to control whether their employees temporarily leave the work
force to care for a new child. In addition, they claim that financial hardship caused by unpaid family
leave is exaggerated, and that BAA-UC is poorly targeted to alleviate these financial concerns in any
case. Even worse, opponents caution that BAA-UC benefits may actually harm the target population,
because employers will likely reduce their own voluntary provision of benefits in response to the
regulation. Finally, opponents caution that the BAA-UC regulation will lead to higher payroll taxes and
depleted UI trust funds. See, e.g., UWC, Statement on Unemployment Compensation and the Family
and Medical Leave Act Before the Special Legislative Task Force on Temporary Disability, Family
Medical Related Leave, and Retirement And the Joint Committee on Commerce and Labor Of the
Massachusetts Great and General Court (statement of Eric J. Oxfeld), at
http://www.uwcstrategy.org/Issues/testimony 062600.html (last visited Apr. 20, 2002).
173. The plaintiffs include LPA, Inc. (a non-profit business organization representing more than
two hundred leading U.S. corporations), the Society for Human Resource Management (the world's
largest association of human resource practitioners), the Chamber of Commerce of the United States of
America (representing more than three million businesses and organizations, with 92% of its 140,000
direct members being small businesses), as well as Counterpulsation, Inc. and Danneman's Auto
Service, Inc. (small businesses with fewer than 50 employees). The complaint requests declaratory and
injunctive relief requiring the withdrawal of the final rule that adopted the regulations and the regulation
itself, as well as a declaration that the regulation and rule are otherwise invalid. See SHRM,
SHRM/LPA/Chamber of Commerce Complaint, at http://www.shrm.org/press/releases/uicomplaint.pdf
(last visited Mar. 22, 2002).
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all employers in the state to a 700% payroll tax increase.1 74 The regulations
have provided employers a safe harbor for BAA-UC benefits, and assured
states that their systems will be considered compliant if they comply with the
regulations. States considering this safe harbor include Florida (H.R. 1245, S.
500), Illinois (S. 389), Kansas (H.R. 2232), Louisiana (H.R. 1572), Maryland
(H.R. 933), Massachusetts (H.R. 774), Minnesota (H.R. 1866, S.F. 1597),
Nebraska (H.R. 370), New Jersey (A.B. 3049, S.. 1923), New Mexico (H.R.
528), Oregon (S.. 241), Pennsylvania (H.R. 1690), and Texas (H.R. 240).'
These states are all considering a system much like the DOL's model
legislation, providing for twelve weeks of UI benefits for birth or adoption.
The Arizona legislature is considering similar bills (H.R. 2458, S.. 1059), but is
proposing ninety days of paid benefits.1
76
Several states have also considered bills that would provide benefits even
beyond the scope permitted in the BAA-UC regulations. Georgia's House Bill
342 would pay UI benefits to employees separated from work due to "undue
family hardship," which would include leave to care for a serious illness of the
employee or a family member of the employee, as well as leave related to
domestic violence. 177 Hawaii's House Bill 30 would provide twelve weeks of
UI for birth or adoption, but would also provide benefits for leave due to the
serious health condition of the employee's family member. Indiana's House
Bill 1783 would provide similar coverage to Hawaii's House Bill 30, but also
encompasses paid leave for the employee's own serious health condition.
78
c. Evaluation of UI's Potential to Insure Family Risks
The BAA-UC regulations are a far stretch from a system of family risk
insurance. Even assuming that the regulations are legally sound, they are quite
limited in scope and insure only one small area of family risks. Because the
BAA-UC program is strictly voluntary on the states' part, it is also unlikely to
have widespread impact. Beyond the regulations' limitations, however, are
problems underlying the UI system that present serious impediments to
174. The Department of Labor is responsible for ensuring that state laws meet all federal
requirements. Failure of a state law to conform may result in denial of any credit against the federal tax
foi all employers in the state, denial of "additional credit" only (credit for the difference between the rate
an employer actually pays under the state law and 5.4%), denial of administrative grants, or all three.
See HIGHLIGHTS OF FEDERAL UI LAWS, supra note 131, at 3.
175. Unless otherwise noted, all further references to state legislative bills come from National
Partnership for Women & Families, State Family Leave Benefit Initiatives: Making Family Leave More
Affordable, at http://www.nationalpartnership.org/content.cfm?L =8&L2 = 1&GuidelD=51 &
ArticleID=0 (last modified Dec. 1,2001) and the individual state links contained therein.
176. See FMLA Technical Corrections Coalition, Birth and Adoption Leave Compensation:
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insuring family risks. Because its goals are fundamentally inconsistent with the
goals of family risk insurance, and because work tests exclude those most in
need of benefits, this system is a poor choice for insuring most family risks.
179
The primary reason the UI system is inappropriate for insuring most family
risks is that the programs have incompatible goals. Unemployment insurance is
designed to provide income replacement to individuals who have incurred an
involuntarily separation from their employer, but who are still willing and able
to work and who are in fact seeking suitable work. While one can say that
those facing family risks are also involuntarily out of work, in many cases they
have not separated from their employer, but are merely absent or on leave. In
most cases, those experiencing family risks are not willing and able to work,
but are instead unable to work while tending to family needs. As such, these
individuals typically are not actively seeking work. Furthermore, by imposing
additional costs on those employers who lay employees off, UI's experience
rating requirements are designed to provide employers with incentives to make
more efficient use of the labor supply. In most family risk situations, the
employer has no control over whether an employee leaves work. Imposing
additional costs on employers would be less appropriate and more likely to
result in wage discrimination. The rules, eligibility requirements, and legal
precedent of the UI system have all been designed around the goal of helping
individuals find new work, and that is where the system's expertise lies.
In addition, the UI system's work tests would exclude many of those
workers most in need of family leave benefits.' 80  Many states test for
workforce attachment by requiring that claimants have had a minimum amount
of earnings' 81 within a specified base period, which is typically the first four of
the last five completed calendar quarters before the application for benefits.
82
The combination of these requirements tends to disfavor those with low wages,
mostly recent earnings, and those who work part-time. 83  These criteria
179. Eligibility and work test requirements serve to exclude approximately 2/3 of unemployed
workers from receiving benefits. Issue Brief Unemployment Insurance For Low-Income Families: New
Challenges for Child Advocates, supra note 148 (citing UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE SERVICE, U.S.
DEP'T OF LABOR, UNEMPLOYMENT INFORMATION BY STATE FOR CY97.1, UlI DATA SUMMARY (1997)).
180. All states require that claimants demonstrate attachment to the work force by working in
statutorily approved employment for a specified number of hours or weeks, or earning a prescribed sum
during a specified period before becoming unemployed. Maranville, supra note 37, at 297 (footnote
omitted).
18 1. The minimum earnings requirement not only has a disparate impact on low-wage workers, but
also can produce anomalous results. For example, a minimum wage worker might work twice as many
hours as a high-wage counterpart, and yet be denied Ut due to insufficient earnings while the high-wage
counterpart is granted benefits (a bizarre result since the minimum wage worker has obviously
demonstrated more attachment to the workforce). GRAETZ & MASHAW, supra note 11l, at 204.
182. Maranville, supra note 37, at 299-300. ("Under this 'first four' base period approach,
individuals whose recent work is concentrated in the current and immediately preceding quarters are
unlikely to be eligible for benefits, even though they would meet the hours or earnings requirements if
their most recent work were considered.")
183. GRAETZ & MASHAW, supra note I 11, at 196.
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systematically exclude women and low wage workers, who are those most
likely to take time off for family needs or to need wage replacement.
184
State laws regarding partial-week unemployment present another obstacle.
Most states render ineligible those claimants whose earnings during a partial
workweek exceed the weekly benefit amount' and many workers who work
during part of a calendar week receive no benefits. Temporary absences from
employment due to family risks are less likely to fall neatly in a Monday
through Friday pattern than are typical unemployment situations, where
employers can be expected to try to coordinate separations with the calendar
week for payroll purposes. UI would be largely incapable of compensating
employees who miss only partial calendar weeks for family reasons.
Making a UI system family-friendly would require extensive and costly
changes. Altering the system's work tests, in an effort to increase UI eligibility
of women and low-wage workers, would indeed be painting with a broad brush.
Changes to the earnings and base period requirements would reach all
claimants, regardless of family risks, and would entail huge cost increases.'
86
In addition to work test changes, UI's basic pillars - separation from the
employer, the "able and available" and "seeking work" requirements, and
refusal of "suitable employment" - would all have to be waived in order to
insure most family risks.
An alternative to universal Ul reform is to create a new set of work tests
and eligibility rules applied exclusively to those out of work for family reasons.
This approach essentially involves the design and addition of a new insurance
system and abandons Ul entirely. So long as a new system is required, it is
better to start on a clean slate than to work within the confines of a system that
184. Low-income families are the least likely to have paid leave through an employer, and are also
least likely to qualify for UI due to minimum earnings requirements. They are also more likely than
others to work in jobs that require shift work, which makes child care problematic and contributes to
frequent job loss. Also, because individuals who recently joined the work force are often ineligible for
UI, low-income families' tendency to have less steady job histories excludes them for this reason. In
addition, women are more likely to need leave for family reasons than are men; yet, because women
earn less than their male counterparts, UI earnings rules disqualify twice as many women who leave the
work force. Issue Brief Unemployment Insurance for Low-Income Families: New Challenges for Child
Advocates, supra note 148 (citation omitted). The base period requirements also exclude "women
following the traditional homemaker script who are forced into the labor market by unexpected
necessities until they can satisfy the work test. Similarly, many individuals who combine work and
care-taking activities are likely to fail the 'work test' requirement at times, either because they move in
and out of the work force, or because of insufficient part-time earnings." Maranville, supra note 37, at
298.
185. HIGHLIGHTS OF STATE UI LAWS, supra note 132, at 58 tbl. 22.
186. One possible modification would be to abandon the "first four" base period approach in favor
of a ""movable base period' which allows claimants to qualify for benefits based on wages earned in a
recent or current quarter." Maranville, supra note 37, at 300. Another modification would be to lower
the earnings threshold. Either lowering the total amount of earnings required or the total number of
weeks would achieve this goal. Alternatively, a state could rely simply on a threshold number of hours
worked, which would help low-wage workers qualify for benefits. Id. at 303.
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was designed for a different purpose and that has sixty-five years of legal
precedent biased against protecting family risks.
The approach to UI reform FRIP advocates is to preserve the integrity of
UI's basic requirements, but to make targeted changes to accommodate those
family risks that are compatible with the UI system's goals. It uses the UI
system to provide wage replacement only to those workers who have suffered a
complete separation from their most recent employer, and who are able,
available, and actively seeking new work. 1
87
Recognizing that the system requires some updating, FRIP also
encompasses FUTA amendments to update the "voluntary quit," "able and
available," and "suitable work" requirements in a manner more consistent with
the needs of working families.
"[I]n all states, workers who 'voluntarily quit' their employment without
good cause are disqualified from receiving unemployment benefits. To the
extent that family reasons are not considered good cause, workers who leave
their employment either due to family emergencies or because they are unable
to comply with a change in their work schedule are disadvantaged by this
requirement."' 1'8 Recognizing that workers should not have to choose between
their families and their incomes in times of crisis, a comprehensive system to
insure family risks would ideally create a general good cause exception for
workers who quit because of compelling family circumstances. At the very
least, FRIP would excuse those who leave work due to domestic violence, those
who must relocate with a spouse, and those who experience an FMLA-
qualifying reason but are not provided job-protected leave because they don't
satisfy coverage or eligibility requirements.' 89 It also requires modifying good
cause "attributable to the employer" to include circumstances where employers
187. This accords with the Oregon Court of Appeals' position in York v. Morgan, 16 Or. App. 76,
517 P.2d 301, 302 (1973), which states, "While sound public policy indicates that concern for family is
to be encouraged, it does not follow that unemployment compensation may be used to foster it.
Unemployment compensation is designed to ease the burden of those who are generally available in the
labor market but for whom no suitable gainful employment is available. It was not created to ease the
burden of those who for one reason or another are not generally available."
188. Maranville, supra note 37, at 298 (footnote omitted). In cases where an employer refuses to
allow an employee to take time off to attend to a family need or changes an employee's work schedule
in a way that conflicts with the employee's care-giving responsibilities, the employee may be left with
only two choices-to defy the directive and be fired or to resign rather than comply. In the former case,
the employer will seek to disqualify the claimant for misconduct; in the latter, the employer may seek a
disqualification based on a voluntary quit. Malin, supra note 10, at 136. Ironically, Professor Malin
finds that the option the employee chooses is largely determinative of UI eligibility. Employees
discharged for defying an employer directive fared much better in UI litigation than those who resigned
from employment. See id. at 139. We see these anomalous results because most jurisdictions recognize
family obligations as a mitigating factor precluding disqualification for willful misconduct, but do not
excuse quits because the family obligation is considered "personal" and not "attributable to the
employer"-even where the conflict is precipitated by employer action. Id. at 142-43.
189. To prevent moral hazard problems, states could adopt the Washington approach to spousal
relocation, which limits UI benefits to those situations where the spouse's relocation was mandated by
an employer. See supra note 147 and accompanying text.
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refuse reasonable accommodations of family circumstances or where the
employee is forced to quit work because the employer changed requirements in
a way that makes care-taking arrangements unsuitable.' 90 This good cause
exception would not excuse claimants from meeting UI's other requirements,
such as being able, available, and actively seeking work.191
UI availability requirements also present obstacles for family caretakers.
Availability is generally "defined according to standards fitting the male
breadwinner script," and workers are likely to be denied benefits unless they
purport to be "available for employment on a full-time, year-round basis,
regardless of the assigned shift" or the days of the work week. 192 Many
caretakers, however, choose to or need to work part-time to accommodate
family circumstances. Childcare considerations may preclude caretakers from
working certain hours or days of the week. A comprehensive family risk
insurance system would modify availability provisions to accommodate
reasonable part-time work and shift restrictions. Some courts have addressed
part-time work restrictions and provided guidance for determining availability.
Following their example, FRIP would allow a claimant seeking part-time work
to receive UI benefits so long as this limitation does not unduly restrict
availability in light of the conditions of the surrounding market, and so long as
the claimant has a reasonable opportunity to secure part-time employment. 193 It
would apply this same standard of examining surrounding market conditions
and the likelihood of finding employment when making availability
determinations for workers who claim to have shift work and other similar
restrictions.
In addition, employees who decline job offers due to work-family conflicts
are frequently disqualified for refusal of suitable employment without just
cause. 1 Suitability evaluations have traditionally been limited to the
190. Malin advocates this position and develops specific recommendations for how it might be
implemented. Among them is a requirement that employers make "reasonable" accommodations and
have legitimate business reasons for denying employee requests. Malin, supra note 10, at 168-173. A
rule denying benefits where the accommodation would be unreasonable or would legitimately harm the
business may assuage employer concerns about operating flexibility and cost increases due to
experience rating.
191. During the period in which the individual is not able and available for work, the worker may
still receive benefits under other aspects of the Proposal. For example, victims of domestic violence
could receive benefits under the supplemental system of insurance discussed in Part III. Individuals who
are absent for reasons covered by FMLA, but who are not eligible for job-protected leave, could receive
income replacement under an expanded TDI system as discussed in Section I.B.2.c.
192. Maranville, supra note 37, at 299 (footnote omitted). Treatment of shift availability varies
across states. While a few states provide that caretakers need not be available during the "third" shift,
this approach "fail[s] to address fully the broader need to accommodate domestic responsibilities for all
workers." The availability of evening daycare for young children varies by locality. "[Dlepending on
the age and maturity of the children, the availability of other adults to assist with supervision, and the
workers' own sleep patterns, the responsible adult might find the late-night shift either impossible or
preferable." Id. at 324-25.
193. Id. at 322 nn.121-123 and accompanying text.
194. Malin, supra note 10, at 136.
2002]
Yale Journal of Law and Feminism
position's required skill level, responsibility, and compensation.1 95  This
practice reflects a social policy determination that it is wasteful force
employees into underemployment. 196 Social policy should also recognize that
it is wasteful to use UI to force workers into employment incompatible with
family circumstances. Some states already provide suitability exceptions for
family circumstances, and allow workers to collect benefits either by finding
that the work-family conflict renders the job "unsuitable," or by finding that the
worker had "good cause" for refusing it. 197  FRIP would extend these
nationally.
2. Temporary Disability Insurance
Another approach that might be used to insure family risks is expansion of
the Temporary Disability Insurance programs found in California, Hawaii, New
Jersey, New York, Rhode Island, and Puerto Rico. Some of these states are
considering expanding TDI coverage to include family risks. Other states
without TDI programs are considering their adoption, and would cover other
family risks as well. This Section describes characteristics of TDI plans
already in place, and why the TDI model is preferable to UI for insuring family
risks. It then proposes a national TDI expansion for insuring family risks.
a. Description of TDI System
Unlike the unemployment insurance system, there is no federal substantive
statute providing baseline requirements with which TDI programs must
comply. The only mention of TDI in a federal statute is a 1946 Social Security
Act amendment allowing withdrawal of employee UI contributions for
payment of disability benefits. 198 Most state Temporary Disability Insurance
programs were created immediately after World War II, when there were UI
fund surpluses. California, New Jersey, and Rhode Island took advantage of
the Social Security amendment and used their employee Ul contributions to
start a disability income fund.199
All state TDI programs provide wage replacement to state residents who
are unable to work because of a temporary, non-occupational disability.200 This
temporary disability requirement typically refers to the individual's inability to
195. Id. at 148.
196. Id. at 171 (footnote omitted).
197. Id. at 148.
198. See HIGHLIGHTS OF STATE UI LAWS, supra note 132, at 95. Only nine states require
employee contributions. See DOL UI Law Tables, supra note 147, at § 600.
199. See DOL UILaw Tables, supra note 147, at § 615.
200. STEVE IDEMOTO, ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITY INSTITUTE, Family Leave Insurance: A Proposal




perform his or her customary work because of a physical or mental
condition.20 ' Unemployed individuals with temporary disabilities must meet
more stringent requirements, and are typically eligible only if they are unable to
perform any work for which they are reasonably qualified.2 °2  Following the
passage of the Pregnancy Discrimination Act' ° 3 in the 1970s, TDI coverage
was extended to provide benefits to women who were unable to work due to
pregnancy or childbirth.204  In covering these two reasons - temporary
disability and pregnancy disability leave - state TDI systems provide income
replacement benefits for approximately 60% of all FMLA leaves taken within
the relevant states.205
Because there are no federal substantive requirements, each of the existing
TDI programs is unique. The programs utilize different financing mechanisms,
benefit levels, eligibility requirements and administrative bodies.
Funding methods vary across states. In Rhode Island, for example, "all
contributions are paid into a pooled state fund and all benefits are paid from
that fund., 20 6 Three states have opted for a "play-or-pay" strategy rather than
mandate participation in the state insurance pool. 20 7 California, New Jersey,
and Puerto Rico allow employers to substitute coverage under a private plan for
participation in the state fund so long as the plan receives state agency approval
and meets minimum requirements. 208  TDI laws in Hawaii and New York
require employers to take positive action to provide a minimum level of
disability insurance for their workers, and allow them to collect small
contributions from employees toward the cost of such coverage.2 9 Both states
also operate special funds for disability benefits to be paid to the
unemployed.210
The states have used varying methods for imposing payroll taxes, with
some requiring employer contributions, some employee contributions, and
some collecting from both sources. In any scenario, contributions are very
small. The California system is financed entirely by employee premiums. The
contribution rate is currently 0.9% and applies to all wages up to a maximum of
201. DOL UI Law Tables, supra note 147, at § 605.
202. Id.
203. Pub. L. No. 95-555, 92 Stat. 2076 (1978) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k)).
204. IDEMOTO, supra note 200.
205. See BALANCING THE NEEDS OF FAMILIES AND EMPLOYERS, supra note 47, at 2-5 tbl.2.3.
206. DOL U1Law Tables, supra note 147, at § 615.01.
207. See id.
208. In order to opt-out of the state fund, "California law requires that private plans provide
benefits rights greater than those under the State plan in all respects. In Hawaii, New Jersey, and Puerto
Rico, private plan benefit must be at least as favorable as those under State plans." Id. at § 620.06.
209. In Hawaii, "private plan benefits must be at least as favorable" as the state plan, but deviations
are allowed so long as benefits provided "are actuarially equal or better. In New York adherence to a
statutory formula is not required," but "[b]enefits must be actuarially equivalent to the statutory formula.
Cash benefits in the formula ... may be reduced if the plan of insurance includes a shorter waiting
period or other benefits, such as hospitalization benefits." Id.
210. Id. at § 615.01.
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$46,327 per employee per calendar year.21' Employees in Rhode Island
finance the system through a payroll tax of 1.3% on all earnings up to a
maximum of $38,000.212 In New Jersey, employees pay 0.5% "on wages up to
the taxable wage base," with employers contributing an additional 0.5% subject
213to experience rating. In New York, employers are required to provide
insurance, but employees may be required to contribute 0.5% of wages, up to
$.60 per week.2 14 "Employee contributions in Hawaii are limited to half the




Those "[e]mployees covered by private plans in California, New Jersey and
Puerto Rico cannot be required to pay higher contributions than they would pay
to the State fund,, 216 but employees in New York may be required to contribute
more if the additional private benefits exceed the statutory formula and
"warrant the additional cost. ' 2 17 These relatively low contribution rates can be
partially attributed to interest earned on the amounts placed in the disability
funds early in the programs' histories.2 18
TDI administration also varies across states. The most popular approach is
to administer TDI in conjunction with the state's UI program, with California,
New Jersey, Puerto Rico, and Rhode Island selecting this option. 219 New York,
in contrast, has linked the program to workers' compensation insurance, and
the workers' compensation board administers its program.220 Hawaii takes a
different approach, and administers its program through a TDI division of the
state Department of Labor and Industrial Relations.
221
The benefits formula is another source of variation. In some cases, TDI
simply adopts the state's UI benefits formula verbatim. Hawaii and New
Jersey, for example, pay unemployed workers with temporary disabilities
211. California Employment Development Department, Contribution Rate, at
http://www.edd.ca.gov/disdi.htm#Rate (last visited Mar. 22, 2002).





217. Id. at§ 620.06.
218.
The separate New Jersey program for disability during unemployment for example is
financed principally by interest on employee contributions withdrawn from the
unemployment trust fund... Hawaii levied a temporary contribution rate of 0.2 percent on
the taxable wages of subject employers from July to December 1969 in order to establish the
Special Disability Fund from which benefits are paid during unemployment... In New York
a temporary contribution from January 1 to July 1, 1950, of 0.1 percent on the first $60
weekly wages by both employers and employees (i.e. not more than 6 cents a week each)
established the fund from which benefits first were paid during unemployment. This fund
has been maintained at $12 million (by statute) by interest earned on the fund, by certain
fines and penalties, and when necessary, by an [additional] assessment.
Id. at §615.03.





exactly as if they were eligible for UI.22 2 In other cases, states have adopted
benefit formulas unique to TDI. This approach is used in California, New
York, Rhode Island, and for employed workers in Hawaii and New Jersey.
223
The benefit levels demonstrate great variability in terms of reimbursement
levels and caps.224 Benefit levels may be equal to, more than, or less than UI
depending on the state.
In several states, TDI eligibility is broader than Ul eligibility due to more
generous work tests. California, for example, uses the "first four" method to
measure the base period, but claimants are required to have only $300 of
earnings during the base period (approximately one-fourth of the earnings
required for UI).225 In Hawaii, claimants must have worked half-time for at
least fourteen weeks to be eligible, and the state's "first four" UI base period is
226abandoned in favor of the four quarters immediately preceding the disability.
Puerto Rico expands eligibility by making TDI minimum earnings
requirements equal to approximately half those required for U1. 227  In New
York, any employee who has worked for four or more consecutive weeks
qualifies for TDI benefits.
228
All of the programs require a seven-day waiting period.229  The states
differ, however, in how this waiting period is applied. In some states, it must
be satisfied at the beginning of each disability period, while in others it must be
satisfied only once per benefit year.230 In some cases, the TDI and UI waiting
period are satisfied simultaneously.
23'
The duration of TDI benefits varies as well. The most generous state is
California, which provides benefits for a maximum of fifty-two weeks. Rhode
Island provides thirty weeks of benefits, and Hawaii, New Jersey, and New
York all provide benefits for a maximum of twenty-six weeks.232
Workers who are absent for a partial week are more likely to receive
benefits under TDI than UI. Employees who have satisfied the waiting period
are compensated for each day of disability, at a rate that is a fraction of the
weekly benefit rate. In Rhode Island, the daily rate is one-fifth of the weekly
222. See id. tbl.600.
223. See id..
224. California pays "55% of previous wages up to $490 per week," Hawaii pays "58% of previous
wages up to 121% of the state average weekly wage," New Jersey "pays two-thirds of previous wages
up to $401 per week," New York pays "50% of previous wages up to $170 per week," and Rhode Island
pays "4.62% of [the employee's] high quarter wages up to $487." IDEMOTO, supra note 200.
225. See DOL UI Law Tables, supra note 147, at tbl.600.
226. See DOL UI Law Tables, supra note 147, at tbl.600; HIGHLIGHTS OF STATE UI LAWS, supra
note 132, at45 tbl.16.
227. See DOL UI Law Tables, supra note 147, at tbl.600; HIGHLIGHTS OF STATE UI LAWS, supra
note 132, at48 tbl.17.




232. Id. § 620.03.
2002]
Yale Journal of Law and Feminism
rate and in California, New Jersey, and Puerto Rico, it is one-seventh of the
233weekly rate. Hawaii and New York compute a daily rate for each claimant
234based on the employee's normal number of workdays per week.
b. Proposals to Expand TDI
Several states with TDI have considered expanding their programs to cover
FMLA-eligible reasons. In 1999, California passed a law to study the cost of
extending the state's TDI program to include employees taking FMLA leave.
New Jersey introduced two bills in 2000 that would award TDI benefits for
FMLA leave--one covering all FMLA reasons (A.B. 1577) and another
covering only serious health conditions of a family member (A.B. 2037). New
York introduced several TDI bills in 2001 that would have covered leave for
FMLA reasons (S. 4473, A. 7405, A. 7453).
This method of family insurance has also caught the eye of state
legislatures in New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Hawaii, and Washington. In
April 2000, New Hampshire passed a law establishing a committee to study
235options for insuring family risks. In 2001, House Bill 744 was considered in
that state, which would create a state TDI system and pay benefits for FMLA
absences for up to twenty-six weeks.236 The system would require a one-week
waiting period, after which benefits would be paid at a level equal to 60% of
237prior wages (capped at 57.5% of the state average weekly wage). The New
Hampshire system would be administered in conjunction with UI, and would be
financed by an employee payroll tax.
238
Massachusetts Senate Bill 744 would create a system of temporary
disability benefits covering up to twelve weeks for birth, adoption, or to care
for a seriously ill family member, and up to twenty-six weeks for an
employee's own serious health condition. 239 Benefits would be funded through
employer contributions to a new fund called the Employment Security Trust
Fund.240 Benefits would be paid at the level of 66% of an employee's average
233. Id. § 620.05.
234. Id.
235. See National Partnership for Women & Families, Work and Family: New Hampshire, at
http://www.nationalpartnership.org/content.cfm?LI=8&L2=1&GuideID=51&ArticlelD=-22 (last visited
Apr. 21, 2002).
In December 2000, the committee issued a report reviewing TDI programs in other states and
estimating the average weekly cost for starting such a program in New Hampshire at $1.83 per covered
employee. See id.
236. See id.; H.R. 744, 157th Leg. (N.H. 2001) §275-F:2(I).
237. See H.R. 744, 157th Leg. (N.H. 2001) § 275-F:3(III).
238. See id.§ 275-F:6(II).
239. See National Partnership for Women & Families, State Initiatives: Making Family Leave
More Affordable, at http://www.nationalpartnership.org/workandfamily/fmleave/flinsur.htm (last




weekly wage (capped at 57.5% of the state average weekly wage). 241 The
proposed program would be administered through the UI system, but would
allow employers to provide qualifying private plans and opt-out of the state
insurance fund.242
Hawaii's House Bill 31 would finance its proposed program by a tax
imposed on both employers and employees, with each contributing one cent per
hour.243 This system would have a one-week waiting period, a maximum
payment of $250 per week, and would be administered in conjunction with the
workers' compensation system.244
Washington's Senate Bill 5420 is similar in many respects to Hawaii's
245proposed program. Provision of family leave benefits would be financed by
a tax imposed on both employers and employees, with each contributing one
246cent per hour. To qualify, individuals would have to work at least 520 hours
247 248in the qualifying year and satisfy a one-week waiting period.
Additionally, applicants would have to comply with notice requirements and
make efforts not to disrupt the employer's operations. 249 Benefits would be
payable up to five weeks per yeara25 at the rate of $250 a week, and part-time
251workers would receive a prorated amount. Individuals with paid family
leave benefits from an employer or private disability insurance would be able to
252elect whether to first receive private benefits or those from the state program,
and self-employed individuals would be able to elect coverage. 253 The program
would be administered by the Department of Labor and Industries, which also
administers the state's workers' compensation and family leave laws. 4
c. Evaluation of TDI's Potential to Insure Family Risks
The TDI system is an attractive method for insuring family risks.
Expanding this system would fill a void left by federal social insurance
systems. Because disabled individuals are not eligible for Social Security
Disability Insurance until after they have been disabled for five months, and
because private disability insurance is limited in availability due to market
241. Id.
242. See S. 744, 182nd Leg. (Mass. 2001) §§ 6(1)(a)-(b); 4(l)(a)-(d); 3.
243. See H.R. 31, 21st Leg. (Haw. 2001) § 2.
244. See id. §§ 1, 2.
245. S. 5420, 57th Leg. (Wash. 2001).
246. See id. § 21(1)(a).
247. See id. § 4(2).
248. See id § 7(l).
249. See id. §§ 4(6)(a), (b), (b)(ii).
250. See id. § 7(t).
251. See id. § 8(1).
252. See id. § 9(2).
253. See id. § 13(l).
254. See id. § 2(4).
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failure, there is no safety net for many Americans who become temporarily
disabled and leave the work force.255 Existing TDI programs already cover
approximately sixty percent of FMLA absences and do so at low cost.
Expanding coverage to the remaining FMLA categories would require small
additional costs and would capitalize on an existing system of eligibility and
256administration.
When compared with UI, TDI provides a superior model for insuring
family risks. For example, TDI's goals are more compatible with family risks
than are those of the UI system. Whereas UI's objective is to provide wage
replacement to enable a claimant to search for suitable work, TDI provides
wage replacement to allow a worker to remain out of work while he or she
resolves a problem impeding work force participation. TDI's more generous
eligibility requirements are also more likely to reach those who are most in
need of family risk insurance - women and low-wage workers-because its work
tests accommodate lower wages, recent earnings, and part-time work. The TDI
system also utilizes an employee contribution, which is appropriate for family
risks because they are more within an employee's control than the risk of• 257
involuntary unemployment. The TDI system, unlike UI, has no complicating
body of legal precedent that is biased against those most in need of leave. TDI
has no availability rules excluding those working part-time or with restricted
shift availability. The mechanism for compensating for partial-week absences
is also more suitable, since it is more likely to provide benefits to those with
partial-week absences. As evidenced by several states, TDI can be
administered in conjunction with UI, in order to capitalize on an existing
system.
California, New Jersey, and Puerto Rico also provide an excellent model
for employer participation. Their "play or pay" model, which exempts
employers from contributions if they provide benefits equal to or better than the
state mandate, would preserve the incentive for employers to provide different
255. Professor Hartmann speculates that this is again rooted in the male breadwinner assumption
underlying many social insurance programs. She explains that if you assume the woman in the family is
not working, then you assume she can go to work and take care of family income when the man is
temporarily ill. See Symposium, Unbending Gender: Why Family and Work Conflict and What to Do,
About It, 49 AM. U. L. REV. 851, 872-873 (2000).
256. The National Partnership for Women & Families has gathered cost estimates from several
studies that examined the costs of expanding these three state TDI systems to cover all FMLA absences.
They estimate that the expansion would cost between $.07 and $.21 per covered worker per week in
New York, between $.85 and $.89 in New Jersey, and $1.45 in California. The study ordered by the
California state legislature estimated costs at only $.88 per worker per week. National Partnership for
Women & Families, Summary Charts: Estimated Cost of Expanding State Unemployment Insurance
(U!) or Temporary Disability Insurance (TDI) Programs to Cover Periods of Family and Medical
Leave, at http://www.nationalpartnership.org/workandfamily/fmleave/expansion/uitdichartl.htm (last
visited Mar. 29, 2002).
257. Whenever a risk is partially within the insured's control, moral hazard becomes a concern, and




and better benefits, while providing small employers with a competitive group
plan for their employees. FRIP would allow this option, however, only for the
portion of premiums attributable to insuring the employee's own disability.
25 8
This would encourage employers to provide group disability insurance and
implement cost-effective disability management programs, which may in turn
reduce employer costs and assist in employee rehabilitation. It would not allow
an opt-out for the portion of premiums attributable to other family leave
benefits. One factor influencing this determination is that employer-based
benefits specifically for paid family leave are practically non-existent. Even
more important is the employer perception that family leave benefits are a
"women's issue." Under Jolls' framework for accommodation mandates
discussed in Section II.A.2.c., employers directly providing this benefit are
likely to shift the costs to female workers in the form of lower wages. By
imposing the same costs on an employer regardless of how its employees
utilize benefits, this limitation would remove any employer incentive for wage
discrimination. 9 Disability benefits are less often perceived as a "women's
issue," and so are less likely to produce discriminatory wage effects if self-
insured. Furthermore, FRIP would allow self-employed individuals the option
to join both insurance pools.
Ideally, FRIP would be implemented by creating a federal TDI program
providing wage replacement for all absences listed as qualifying reasons in the
FMLA (with the exception of its new requirement for twenty-four hours of
leave for educational activities and medical appointments, which would remain
unpaid). A national program is preferable for the purpose of equity, so that all
Americans are provided with this important safety net. A federal substantive
statute would avoid the variety in program design that exists in the UI system,
which has resulted in a "race to the bottom," discriminating against workers
facing family risks. FRIP limits the use of this system to FMLA-qualifying
risks, because national consensus holds that these risks deserve federal support
and protection, and a majority of employees are already guaranteed job-
protected leave for such absences. Providing income replacement to workers
through social insurance should not greatly increase costs for employers
covered by the FMLA, since, at most, they should expect to see an eleven
percent increase in leave take-up rates.260  Those employers not covered by
FMLA may also see an increase in absenteeism due to provision of paid
258. Employers opting out of participation in the disability risk pool would still be charged a small
portion of the premium. This would help defray the increased costs that the pool will experience if the
lowest-risk employers opt out.
259. See supra notes 10 1-104 and accompanying text.
260. This estimate is based on the earlier discussion of the number of employees needing family
leave. Since one in eight employees (about 12.5%) who need family leave do not take it because they
cannot afford it, and 88% indicated that they would take leave if some pay were provided, we would
expect to see an 11% increase in take-up rates if pay were provided through a social insurance system.
See text accompanying notes 50-53.
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benefits to their employees. Nevertheless, this effect should be minimal, and
moral hazard should be limited for this population because these workers'
leaves are not job-protected and these workers may lose their jobs even if
collecting benefits.
261
Because Congress may not yet be ready to provide a national paid-leave
program, FRIP would include a phased-in TDI expansion by initially
encouraging states to experiment with TDI for insuring family risks. Because
employers, employees, and the larger society all benefit when workers receive
paid leave benefits, all three would share in the funding. To promote
experimentation, federal funding would be provided out of general revenues to
262participating states, as provided for in FIRST. FIRST grants would be
supplemented with payroll contributions from both employers and employees.
While FRIP does not include a precise recommendation as to the amount of the
payroll tax, it would be structured as a percentage of employee wages, similar
to the TDI systems today. In order to protect low-income workers unable to
afford additional payroll taxes, FRIP would exempt workers making less than a
specified amount, perhaps workers at or slightly above the poverty level, from
contributing. It would also structure benefit payments as a percentage of prior
earnings, but would provide a minimum benefit level to insure income
adequacy and would cap payments at some multiple of the state's average
weekly wage. In relation to this cap on benefit levels, FRIP would likewise
place an upper cap on taxable earnings, so that high-income employees do not
make contributions far exceeding their expected benefits. Before benefits
could be paid, claimants would have to satisfy a one-week waiting period
within the benefit year. This combination of incomplete wage replacement and
a waiting period are necessary to combat moral hazard considerations. The
Proposal also follows Massachusetts' lead and would provide up to twenty six
weeks of benefits for temporary disability (protecting the worker during the
period preceding SSDI eligibility) and twelve weeks of benefits for other
family risks (corresponding with the FMLA).
In order to defray costs associated with replacing absent workers, FRIP
would use a portion of TDI benefits to reimburse those employers whose
263workers collected benefits, if those employers are not covered by the FMLA.
261. Under the Proposal, workers who collect benefits under this program would become eligible
for UI benefits at the time they became able and available for work if denied reinstatement by the prior
employer. See note 191 and accompanying text.
262. FRIP would also allow states to withdraw a portion of Ul fund surpluses in order to start a TDI
program. This could reduce the payroll taxes because the surpluses would accumulate interest that could
offset program costs. See supra note 218 and accompanying text.
263. This idea is based on Issacharoff and Rosenblum's proposal to provide a similar benefit to
employers whose employees receive pregnancy benefits through UI. Since firms suffer costs in terms of
lost production or the need to pay for temporary labor, their proposal would have paid employers a
contribution when workers leave due to pregnancy. This proposal would both defray replacement costs
and eliminate disincentives to hire females of childbearing age. The greater the specialization of job
skills, the greater the benefits that would go to the firm, as a reflection of the presumptively higher costs
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This effort should assist small employers who incur replacement costs, and
should help justify their contributions and reduce their tendency to shift the
payroll tax to workers in the form of reduced wages.2 4
For ease of administration, FRIP would be administered in conjunction
with the UI system. This would allow claimants to file a single application for
benefits under either program, and to easily transition between TDI and UI as
their eligibility and availability for work change. Although new employees and
computer systems would be required, and administration costs would need to
be funded from the taxes generated from the TDI system, this combination
would have the benefit of a trained work force of administrators already in
place.
Admittedly, combining family risk insurance with TDI will present the
system with new problems and will require new solutions. Whereas moral
hazard in disability can be combated with close medical monitoring and second
opinions, moral hazard in family risks may be harder to deal with. However,
by limiting the family risks insured by this system to those covered by the
Family and Medical Leave Act-birth, adoption or placement of a child, or a
serious health condition of an employee or family member-the system retains
this ability to rely on medical science for most determinations. Those events
that are not medically determinable-adoption or placement-are legally
determinable. By limiting insurance coverage to these risks, the system may
continue to rely on independent professionals to make the initial certification of
eligibility, and may use independent examinations and monitoring to ensure
continued compliance.
3. Temporary Assistance to Needy Families (TANF)
Whether a UI model or a TDI model is used to insure family risks, there
will always be families who do not qualify for insurance because they fail to
satisfy the work tests. Since the 1930s, America has provided a safety net for
poor individuals with children who are out of work and do not qualify for other
forms of social insurance. 26  Throughout much of the twentieth century, this
safety net was primarily associated with the program known as Aid to Families
with Dependent Children (AFDC). In 1996, with the passage of the Personal
Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act (PRWORA),
266
of providing replacements. Samual Issacharoff & Elyse Rosenblum, Women and the Workplace:
Accommodating the Demands of Pregnancy, 94 COLUM. L. REv. 2154, 2218-19 (1994).
264. Employers opting to self-insure their disability benefits would remain eligible for this
provision, since they would still be contributing a portion of the premium.
265. Approximately 9% of all families taking FMLA leave, and 20% of low-income families taking
such leave, resort to such public assistance in order to survive during periods of unpaid leave. A
WORKABLE BALANCE, supra note 89, at 110-111 & fig. 5.12.
266. Pub. L. No. 104-193, 110 Stat. 2105 (1996) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 8, 42
U.S.C.).
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Congress replaced AFDC's federal-state match with a system of federal block
grants under a replacement program known as Temporary Assistance to Needy
Families (TANF). This Section does not examine details of benefit provisions
under TANF, but instead examines how the system's block grant and
Maintenance of Effort (MOE) structure might be used to create a new safety
net for low-income families incurring family risks.
a. Description of TANF System
The TANF system "[p]rovides time-limited assistance to needy families
with children to promote work, responsibility, and self-sufficiency. 267 Under
the new system, each state is eligible to receive a block grant of federal TANF
funds, with which it designs and operates a program to accomplish the purposes
of TANF. 268 The amount of each state's block grant was based upon federal
welfare spending in a base period, which was the higher of spending levels in
2691994, 1995, or the 1992-94 spending average. In order to continue receiving
grants at this level, states have to meet Maintenance of Effort (MOE)
requirements by continuing state spending at a level equal to eighty percent of
270their base period AFDC expenditures.
Sustained economic growth throughout the late 1990's, combined with
changes to federal and state welfare policies during the same period, have led to
significantly reduced welfare caseloads in most states.27' Meanwhile, the level
of federal TANF block grants, based on the historically high caseload and
272spending levels of the mid-1990's, have remained constant. This
combination of reduced caseloads and fixed funding has led to a situation
where available funds exceed amounts needed to fulfill existing TANF program
commitments.
273
267. ADMIN. FOR CHILDREN AND FAMILIES, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, Home
Page, at http://www.acf.dhhs.gov/programs/acfdps/index.htm (last visited Mar. 22, 2002).
268. Id. The purposes of TANF include: (1) providing assistance to needy families so that children
may be cared for in their own homes or in the homes of relatives; (2) ending the dependence of needy
parents on government benefits by promoting job preparation, work and marriage; (3) preventing and
reducing the incidence of out-of-wedlock pregnancies and establishing annual numerical goals for
preventing and reducing the incidence of these pregnancies; and (4) encouraging the formation and
maintenance of two-parent families. See 45 C.F.R. § 260.20 (2000).
269. MARK H. GREENBERG, CENTER FOR LAW AND SOCIAL POLICY, BEYOND WELFARE: NEW
OPPORTUNITIES TO USE TANF TO HELP LOW-INCOME WORKING FAMILIES 4 (1999), available at
http://www.clasp.org/pubs/TANF/markKELLOGG.htm.
270. Id. This level is reduced to 75% for states that satisfy the Act's work participation rate
requirements. See MARK H. GREENBERG & STEVEN SAVNER, CENTER FOR LAW AND SOCIAL POLICY,
A BRIEF SUMMARY OF KEY PROVISION OF THE TEMPORARY ASSISTANCE FOR NEEDY FAMILIES BLOCK
GRANT OF H.R. 3734 (THE PERSONAL RESPONSIBILITY AND WORK OPPORTUNITY RECONCILIATION
ACT OF 1996), available at http://www.clasp.org/pubs/TANF/clbskp.html.
271. CENTER ON BUDGET AND POLICY PRIORITIES, REINVESTING WELFARE SAVINGS: AIDING






These surpluses create opportunities to move to the "next stage of welfare
reform.2 74 Proponents of the 1996 law maintained that the new structure of
block grants would institute a "virtuous cycle," whereby states achieving
caseload declines would be able to reinvest the resulting savings in programs to
expand help for low-income families and to assist harder-to-employ
individuals. 275 This block grant structure is authorized through 2002, and it
remains uncertain what Congress will do to the program's structure during
reauthorization. 276  The best way to ensure sustained funding after 2002,
however, would be for states to use the currently available funds in a
constructive way that helps low-income families.277
b. Proposals to Expand TANF
Each state has considerable discretion in spending its surplus funds, as long
as the spending is consistent with TANF's purposes. Several public policy
organizations have suggested that these welfare reinvestment funds be used to
fund wage replacement for low-income individuals taking family leave. In its
Proposal for Paid Family Leave, the Economic Opportunity Institute (EOI)
explored the idea of using part of Washington state's $200 million TANF
surplus to fund a system of paid family leave for low-income workers. 278 The
National Association of Child Advocates suggests using TANF or MOE dollars
for a similar purpose, by creating an alternative UI system. This system would
incorporate many of UI's current features, but would base labor force
attachment on more recent earnings, require a lower earnings threshold, and
would incorporate job loss standards more consistent with the experiences of
low-income workers with children. 2 7 9 The Illinois state legislature considered,
but failed to pass, a proposal to use state MOE funds for this purpose in
1997.280
c. Evaluation of TANF's Potential to Insure Family Risks
States may spend block grant and MOE funds "in any manner reasonably
calculated to accomplish the purposes of TANF."'2s  Using welfare
274. Id.
275. Id.
276. GREENBERG, supra note 269, at 4. At least two bills have already been introduced to address
the renewal of the TANF program. H.R. 3113, 107th Cong. (2001); H.R. 3625, 107th Cong. (2001).
277. GREENBERG, supra note 269, at 4.
278. See ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITY INSTITUTE, A PROPOSAL FOR PAID FAMILY LEA vE: FUNDING
FAMILYLEAVE TO BOLSTER FAMILY VALUES (1999), at http://www.econop.org/pflbrief.htm.
279. See National Association of Child Advocates, supra note 145 (citing CENTER ON BUDGET AND
POLICY PRIORITIES, REINVESTING WELFARE SAVINGS: AIDING NEEDY FAMILIES AND STRENGTHENING
WELFARE REFORM (1998)).
280. CENTER ON BUDGET AND POLICY PRIORITIES, supra note 271, at 14.
281. GREENBERG, supra note 269, at 5.
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reinvestment funds to insure family risks for low-income workers would meet
two of TANF's objectives. The first purpose, assisting needy families so that
children may be cared for in their own homes or in the homes of relatives,
would be accomplished by allowing new parents to care for children following
birth, adoption, or illness. The second purpose, promoting job preparation,
work and marriage, would be furthered because evidence shows that workers
who receive income during periods of FMLA leave are far more likely to return
to work than those who were unpaid 2
Funds dedicated to such a program would need to be spent on "needy
families," which include only those in which a child is living with a relative
and the family meets state financial eligibility standards. 283  States have
discretion in determining appropriate income eligibility limits, and may set
different caps for different programs. Thus, income limits for family risk
insurance could be set at levels substantially higher than the basic TANF cash
assistance program, and could reach a greater segment of the low-income
population.284
An important consideration in system design is selecting the precise source
of funding. There are three basic funding options for utilizing welfare
reinvestment dollars: (1) commingling federal TANF and state MOE funds in a
single program, so that each family's assistance is funded with a mixture of
state and federal funds; (2) segregating state from federal funds in the state's
TANF program, so that among families in the program, some families are
receiving federally-funded TANF assistance and some families are receiving
state-funded MOE dollars; or (3) expending state MOE funds in a separate state
program that receives no federal TANF funds.2 85 The funding decision plays a
key role because it determines whether recipients will be subject to federal
TANF program requirements. In the first option (commingling), recipients are
counted as part of the state's welfare caseload and subject to all federal TANF
requirements, including the sixty-month lifetime assistance limit, work and
participation requirements, and the requirement to assign child support to the
286state. In the second option (segregation), families receiving only state MOE
282. See supra note 168 and accompanying text.
283. GREENBERG, supra note 269, at 6.
284. Id.
285. STEVE SAVNER & MARK GREENBERG, CENTER FOR LAW & Soc. POLICY, THE NEW
FRAMEWORK: ALTERNATIVE STATE FUNDING CHOICES UNDER TANF 1-2 (1997), available at
http://www.clasp.org/pubs/TANF/fnlsfnd.html.
286. See id. at 2. Although the TANF regulations promulgated in 1999 waive this requirement for
certain "non-assistance" benefits provided with TANF funds, it is not clear that family risk insurance
would fall within any of the exceptions. The only exclusion that might encompass this program is that
excluding non-recurrent short-term benefits that are designed to deal with a specific crisis situation or
episode of need, are not intended to meet recurrent or ongoing needs, and that will not extend beyond
four months. See MARK GREENBERG & STEVE SAVNER, CENTER FOR LAW & SOC. POLICY, THE FINAL
TANF REGULATIONS: A PRELIMINARY ANALYSIS 3 (1999), available at
http://www/clasp.org/pubs/TANF/finalregs.html. Because many family risks are recurrent, they would
probably run afoul of the exception.
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funds are not subject to the federal time limits, but are still considered part of
the caseload and are subject to work and child support requirements. 287 In the
third option (separation), the recipients are not considered "welfare recipients"
or part of the state's caseload, and none of the federal TANF requirements
apply.
288
The third funding approach would be the most appropriate for family risk
insurance because it would enable states to reach a broader range of low-
income families without adding to welfare caseloads or subjecting recipients to
onerous requirements. This option would avoid the 60-month lifetime limits,
and would allow states to provide income assistance to those who experienced
a family risk after exhausting TANF eligibility. There should be little net cost
to the system, since many of the workers receiving benefits under this new
program would otherwise receive cash assistance under the state's basic TANF
program.
Providing an extra safety net for low-income workers is a sensible addition
to a national family policy because this group is least likely to be able to self-
289insure and least likely to have employer provided benefits. Furthermore,
work force attachment requirements make them least likely to be eligible for UI
or TDI assistance. FRIP would use such a system both to fill in the gaps where
workers do not meet income requirements for UI or TDI, and to provide
income replacement to low-wage workers whose employers do not provide pay
during the short-term absences for which it would otherwise require self-
insurance, if they exceeded /2 day in duration. While these absences, described
as "emergency care" and "appointments" in Section I.D., may present more
moral hazard risks than FMLA absences, most could easily be certified by a
third-party professional as genuine and as requiring the employee's presence.
FRIP would drop from the list those risks that cannot be certified in this
manner, because they present moral hazard risks too great for insurance. For
example, attendance at school and community activities for the educational
advancement of a child, while desirable, simply is not insurable because there
is no objective criteria that could be used to determine whether a parent's
attendance was required, and because the personal consumption element would
be too great.
In order to simplify administration, FRIP would combine administration of
this program with UI and TDI. Again, a claimant could fill out a single
application for benefits, and be seamlessly routed to the appropriate program
and insurance fund. Administrators with an expertise in family risks would all
be located within a single agency. Furthermore, by using state MOE dollars
287. Id. at 2-3.
288. Id. at 3; see also GREENBERG, supra note 269, at 8.
289. See ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITY INSTITUTE, supra note 278.
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and administering the program in this manner, applicants would avoid the
stigma that they might otherwise associate with the receipt of welfare funds.
4. Tax Subsidies
An alternative to creating new funds and administrative programs would be
to provide income replacement through the income tax system. The use of tax
incentives to promote social insurance goals is politically popular because, in
the words of Professors Graetz and Mashaw, it offers "a way for government to
'sponsor' social insurance without making 'government' appear bigger., 290
This Section describes some tax incentives currently used to promote social
insurance goals and their effectiveness. It then explores the implications of
using tax incentives to provide family risk insurance, and ultimately concludes
that this would be both inequitable and ineffective.
a. Description of Programs Currently Funded by Tax Subsidies
Tax incentives are a component of several social insurance programs.
They are used, for example, to subsidize health insurance, old age pensions and
childcare. The tax incentives provided by these three programs may be divided
into two categories: (1) those designed to promote voluntary sponsorship of
employer benefit plans, and (2) those providing a direct taxpayer subsidy.
Employers are encouraged to provide fringe benefits to their workers
through tax code provisions that not only allow the employer to deduct the cost
of premiums as a business expense, but also exclude the employer contributions
from payroll taxes such as social security. 291 From an employee's viewpoint,
employer premium contributions for health insurance are also excludable from
292gross income. Contributions to a "qualified" pension plan are also excluded
from gross income at the time of contribution, and contributions and investment
returns become includable in the employee's income only at the time of
subsequent distribution from the plan, thus allowing benefits to accrue more
quickly over the employee's lifetime. 293  The Internal Revenue Code also
includes provisions excluding from gross income money contributed to an
employer-sponsored flexible spending account to fund dependent care
290. GRAETZ & MASHAW, supra note 111, at 55.
291. See MICHAEL J. GRAETZ & DEBORAH H. SCHENK, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION: PRINCIPLES
AND POLICIES 113 (3rd ed. 1995).
292. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 106 (a). "Because of the tax advantages, employers find that about 65 cents
of additional health coverage is worth as much as a dollar of cash wages for most of their employees,
and, as a result, have preferred paying additional wages in the form of expanded health benefits."
Graetz, supra note 105, at 82.
293. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 401 (a), (k); see also EMPLOYEE BENEFITS RESEARCH INSTITUTE,




expenses. Some states also provide tax incentives to encourage employer
sponsorship of childcare.2 "
The Code also provides tax subsidies that may be claimed by individual
taxpayers for expenditures on health insurance, pension savings or childcare.
Section 213 of the Code, for example, allows individuals to deduct from
income the cost of health insurance premiums and other medical expenses
296exceeding 7.5% of Adjusted Gross Income. Several types of Individual
Retirement Accounts (IRAs) are also granted special tax treatment. 297 In the
traditional IRA, for example, eligible taxpayers may claim a deduction up to
$3000 per year for contributions to the account, and income accruals are
exempt from taxation until the time of distribution. Dependent care expenses
are subsidized by allowing individual taxpayers to claim a tax credit for
expenses, ranging from 20-30% of eligible expenses, depending on income.
Up to $2,400 of expenses for one child, or $4,800 for two or more children,
298may be eligible under this provision.
b. Proposals to Expand Tax Subsidies
A few states have explored the use of tax incentives to promote employer
provision of family risk insurance. In 2001, the Hawaii state legislature
considered House Bill 89, which would provide a tax credit to employers
providing paid family leave. 299  The credit would be refundable and would
reimburse a percentage of salary expenses for up to four weeks of leave, with a
maximum cap per employee. 300 Likewise, Missouri considered Senate 453,
which would have provided tax credits to employers that provide paid
maternity leave. 0 ' Minnesota and Illinois are considered similar programs, but
described them as "reimbursement" programs rather than tax credits. Under
Minnesota's House 1623 and Senate 1617, employers would be reimbursed for
294. I.R.C. §§ 125 (allowing employers to provide employee benefits via a "cafeteria" plan), 129
(describing dependent care assistance programs). Employers sponsoring cafeteria plans may allow
employees to set aside up to $5,000 of tax-exempt income to be spent during the tax year on qualifying
dependent-care expenses.
295. Gisele Sered, Student Paper: Day Care and Tax Policy, 12 AM. J. TAX POL'Y 194 n.183 and
accompanying text (1995).
296. I.R.C. § 213.
297. The Internal Revenue Code provides for several types of IRAs, including traditional, Roth,
educational and medical accounts. In the traditional IRA, individuals meeting statutory requirements are
allowed to deduct up to $3000 per year from income for contributions to the account. Investment
returns accrue tax free until time of distribution. See I.R.C. § 408. A recent addition is the Roth IRA.
In this arrangement, contributions are not deductible from income, but investment returns accrue tax-
free, and are not taxed at the time of distribution. See I.R.C. §408A.
298. See I.R.C. § 21.
299. See H.R. 89, 21- Leg. (Haw. 2001).
300. See id. § 2.
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50% of their expenses of providing paid birth or adoption leave, with special
reimbursement incentives for low-wage workers.302 Illinois' House Bill 497
would reimburse up to $250 per worker each week for up to twenty-six
weeks.3 °3 Professors Twomey and Jones also suggest that family leave benefits
might be provided through "tax deductions or benefits either on the part of the
employer or the employee which would minimize the expense of paid leave for
that party.
' 304
c. Evaluation of Tax Incentives' Potential to Insure Family Risks
Using tax subsidies as a method of social insurance offers several
advantages. This type of program has the appearance of making government
smaller, both by decreasing the size of the income tax revenues, and by
avoiding the appearance of spending that accompanies appropriations bills.
Furthermore, tax subsidies do not noticeably increase the size of the federal
government's payroll, because programs financed in this manner rely
exclusively on the Internal Revenue Service for administration. Professor
Anne Alstott argues that tax-based transfers reduce bureaucratic cost and
complexity by utilizing existing institutions of the federal income tax.305
Where tax subsidies have been used, Professors Graetz and Mashaw have
described the results as "substantial expenditures for programs that have spotty
coverage, limited durability, and little or no progressivity in their financing."
30 6
The use of tax incentives to promote employer-based, voluntary protections has
not even approached universal coverage, even amongst the population of
employed workers. Only 62.8% of Americans have health insurance provided
by a private employer.307 The distribution of health insurance benefits among
employed Americans reveals that the system provides the least benefits to those
308who work for small employers, a group tending to comprise of women,
302. To qualify, employers would have to pay at least $200 per week in benefits for those
employees earning $300 a week. Reimbursement for these employees is limited to 1/3 of their pre-leave
earnings. For those workers earning less than $300 per week, employers would have to pay at least
$100 in weekly benefits, with the state reimbursing up to $100. Leave must be at least six consecutive
weeks' duration, and reimbursement is limited to 26 weeks. H.F. 1623, 82nd Leg. (Minn. 2001).
303. H.R. 497, 92nd Leg., (Ill. 2001).
304. Rosemarie Feuerbach Twomey & Gwen E. Jones, The Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993:
A Longitudinal Study of Male and Female Perceptions, 3 EMPL. RTs. & EMPLOY. POL'Y J. 229, 249
(1999).
305. Anne Alstott, The Earned Income Tax Credit and the Limitation of Tax-Based Welfare
Reform, 108 HARV. L. REV. 533,565 (1995).
306. GRAETZ & MASHAW, supra note Il , at 299.
307. ROBERT J. MILLS, US. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, CURRENT POPULATION REPORTS: HEALTH
INSURANCE COVERAGE 1999 fig. 1 (1999).
308. Seventy-six percent of employees in medium and large establishments and 64% of employees
in small private establishments have employer-sponsored medical coverage. BENEFITS IN MEDIUM AND
LARGE PRIVATE ESTABLISHMENTS, supra note 80, at 6 tbl.l., BENEFITS IN SMALL PRIVATE
ESTABLISHMENTS, supra note 80, at 7 tbl. I. Only 30.6% of those who worked for employers with less
than 25 employees have employment-based health insurance. MILLS, supra note 307, at 8 fig.3.
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"minorities," and low-wage workers.3t 9 While roughly half of American
workers have private pension coverage,31° plan provision is also skewed in
favor of those working for large employers.311 Only 13% of large and 4% of
small employers offer cafeteria plans with dependent care reimbursement
312accounts. In addition to the regressivity of plan availability, these employer-
sponsored plans provide greater benefits to higher income employees, because
the plans operate as an income exclusion, and workers with higher marginal tax
rates receive greater savings from such an arrangement . 3
Social insurance tax subsidies targeted to individual taxpayers are also
plagued with problems. Again, the use of tax incentives favors higher-income
employees. Tax subsidies offered in the form of tax deductions, such as the
medical deduction or the deductible IRA, provide the greatest benefits to those
with higher marginal tax rates. The medical insurance deduction is especially
regressive, because it is available only to those who itemize their deductions, a
population that tends to be wealthier on average than are those who take the
standard deduction. Subsidies offered in the form of tax credits, such as the
dependent care credit, may pose problems as well. Tax credits that are not
"refundable" provide little or no tax benefit to those with little tax liability.
Credits like the Dependent Care Credit that phase out as income raises help to
ensure progressivity, but only by imposing higher marginal rates on those
taxpayers with incomes falling within the phase-out range. An additional
problem with tax credits is that the taxpayer does not receive them until taxes
are filed in the following year, and so credits do little to alleviate income loss at
the time the employee incurs the expenses. In order to be beneficial for family
risk insurance, the tax credit would have to be both refundable and available on
an advance basis. Structuring it in this manner, however, increases
administrative complexity and moves beyond the services generally offered by
the IRS, and any savings gained by utilizing the existing system of tax
administration may quickly be lost. Data on the Earned Income Tax Credit's
309. See Camilla E. Watson, The Pension Game: Age- and Gender-Based Inequities in the
Retirement System, 25 GA. L. REV. 1, 11 (1990).
310. FUTUREWORK, supra note 3, at 15.
311. Whereas 79% of those who work for medium and large private establishments receive
retirement pension benefits, only 46% of those working for small private establishments receive a
pension. BENEFITS IN MEDIUM AND LARGE PRIVATE ESTABLISHMENTS, supra note 80, at 6 tbl.1;
BENEFITS IN SMALL PRIVATE ESTABLISHMENTS, supra note 80, at 7 tbl. 1.
312. BENEFITS IN MEDIUM AND LARGE PRIVATE ESTABLISHMENTS, supra note 80, at 7 tbl.2;
BENEFITS IN SMALL PRIVATE ESTABLISHMENTS, supra note 80, at 9 tbl.3.
313. Michael Graetz comes to the following conclusion regarding the use of tax incentives to
promote voluntary provision of employer-based pensions:
The tax expenditure mechanism is naturally skewed in favor of high-eamers, and it is not at
all clear that even substantial tightening of the conditions necessary to obtain such tax
benefits... will be sufficient to guarantee a distribution of benefits that is fair to the low- and
moderate-income workers who should have first claim on public subsidies for retirement
savings.
Graetz, supra note 100, at 907.
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advance payment option suggest that taxpayers would be unlikely to take
advantage of this option.
3 4
For the reasons enumerated above, tax subsidies are inappropriate for
insuring family risks. No social insurance program designed to replace labor
income during the working years is structured as a tax incentive. Instead, these
programs, which include Ul, workers' compensation, TDI, and Social Security
Disability benefits, all operate with a tax-and-transfer administrative process.
III. RECOMMENDATIONS AND SOLUTIONS
This Article has explored and evaluated the recent proposals under
consideration for the provision of family risk insurance. Throughout the
Article, it has suggested changes that may be made to existing programs as part
of the Family Risk Insurance Proposal. In this Section, those suggestions are
pulled together to paint a clearer picture of this multifaceted proposal for
insuring family risks. This Section also introduces the last component of FRIP
- a new fund to insure family risks that have been largely left out of the current
debate. Finally, this Section provides examples of how FRIP might help one
family's income security as they journey through life, encountering various
family risks along the way.
A. Recapitulation and Proposals
The first component of the Family Risk Insurance Proposal is an expansion
of the Family and Medical Leave Act. Section II.A. 1.c recommended adoption
of the Right Start Act of 2001, which would provide federal leave grants to
promote expansion of TDI systems, expand coverage to employers with
twenty-five or more employees, and grant twenty-four hours per year to
participate in a child's academic activities. FRIP would add to this twenty-
four-hour grant the ability to use that time for routine and non-emergency
health needs, but would preserve the requirement that such leave be unpaid."'
In addition, FRIP supports expansion of the Act's definition of family and
would begin by granting leave to care for a seriously ill domestic partner,
parent-in-law, adult child, sibling, or grandparent. As the vast majority of
employers surveyed reported that the FMLA had no noticeable effect on
productivity, profitability, or growth, such minor expansions of the Act should
have negligible impact on businesses.
As discussed in section II.B. 1.c, the second component of the Proposal is a
FUTA amendment adding a "good cause" exception to the UI system's
voluntary quit and suitability rules. While the ultimate goal is adoption of a
314. See Alstott, supra note 305, at 581 nn.184-188 and accompanying text.
315. These risks are significant. See supra note 73.
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general "good cause" exception for workers who leave due to any compelling
family circumstance, key to the Proposal are exceptions for employees who
leave employment due to domestic violence, spousal relocations, FMLA-
qualifying reasons experienced by non-FMLA-eligible employees, and job loss
due to employer-induced separations. In all cases, FRIP would provide UI
benefits only during the period in which the claimant is able, available, and
actively seeking work. FRIP would also modify the "able and available"
requirement to accommodate those who work part-time or with restricted shift
availability, as long as the worker does not unduly restrict availability in light
of the conditions of the surrounding market.
The third component of FRIP, as described in section II.B.2.c., is a national
expansion of the TDI system, which would include FMLA qualifying reasons
within the insured risks.316 This system would provide up to twenty-six weeks
of paid leave for an employee's own illness, and up to twelve weeks for birth,
adoption, or placement of a child, or for a qualifying family member's serious
illness.3t 7 These benefits would be available to workers regardless of whether
they work for a covered employer or meet other FMLA eligibility
requirements. Because the wholesale provision of TDI on a national level is
not politically viable at present, FRIP would phase in this national program
with a period of state experimentation encouraged by federal FIRST grants. It
would require employers and employees to share in the funding through payroll
contributions, since both parties, in addition to the larger society, would reap
318benefits from the provision of paid family leave. While FRIP does not make
a precise recommendation regarding the amount of the payroll tax, the tax
would be structured as a percentage of employee wages, and benefit payments
(after the one-week waiting period) would be structured in the same manner.
While employers providing private disability insurance would be allowed to opt
out of this portion of coverage, FRIP would mandate that all employers
participate in the portion of the program insuring other family risks. In an
effort to help small employers defray their replacement costs, FRIP would use a
portion of TDI benefits to reimburse those employers not covered under the
FMLA whose workers collected benefits. The system would be administered
in conjunction with either UI or workers' compensation, in order to capitalize
on existing administrative structures.
316. FRIP would except from this insurance the new 24-hour requirement for job-protected leave
for children's academic activities and routine medical appointments.
317. These benefit periods would not be cumulative. For example, an employee receiving 11
weeks of disability insurance would be eligible for only one week of family insurance during that benefit
year.
318. While obtaining an appropriation from general revenues may be difficult or unlikely, it is
recommended as a way of promoting TDI expansion, and as a symbolic measure reflecting society's
recognition of the benefits it receives when workers are able to take needed family leave. See supra
note 108. General revenues, however, are not essential to this program, which could easily survive with
just employer and employee contributions.
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The fourth component of FRIP uses welfare reinvestment funds to create a
new program for low-income workers, as described in section II.B.3.c. This
program would help fill in the gaps for low-income workers, and provide
benefits to those who would otherwise qualify for family risk insurance under
the UI or TDI proposals but for the work tests. It would also pay benefits to
workers who miss small quantities of work for the short-term absences
described in sections I.D and I.E. for which FRIP would otherwise require self-
or employer-insurance. 319  The Proposal would not insure risks where the
necessity for the parents' attendance could not be certified by a third party
professional, such as attendance at a child's school or community activities,
because moral hazard risks are simply too great in these areas. The precise
source of funding for this program would be state MOE dollars, rather than
TANF block grant funds, in order to avoid federal TANF requirements and
limitations. This system would also be administered in conjunction with UI
and TDI, to simplify application procedures and administration, and to avoid
any stigma that might be associated with receipt of welfare benefits.
Although there has been much discussion about insuring FMLA-eligible
absences, there has been little consideration of other risks that families face.
The fifth and final component of FRIP is to provide insurance for workers
facing other family risks that produce shocks to labor income. FRIP would
insure some of these additional risks, called "extended absences to tend to
family business" in Section I.E. (and described in Section I.D and I.E. under the
headings of as "continued care" and "changes in family structure") by creating
a separate fund for family risk insurance. Since these risks have not received
much national attention or merited an unpaid leave mandate, it would likely be
difficult to convince politicians that they merit treatment equal to that for
FMLA absences. Thus, these risks would be insured with a new system funded
exclusively by employee contributions. For the same reasons, FRIP does not
include immediate provision of insurance for these risks. Instead, this portion
of the Proposal would be implemented after a national TDI expansion was
firmly in place. Because these risks may be more susceptible to moral hazard
than FMLA risks, the waiting period for these risks would be doubled to two
weeks.320 In addition, only those absences lasting more than three consecutive
days in duration would qualify for benefits - a test for "seriousness" borrowed
from the FMLA's definition of a serious health condition. 321. FRIP would also
319. This program might also be used to assist workers who are eligible for TDI or UI during the
one-week waiting period.
320. As previously discussed, most employees who have even one year of service would be able to
cover an absence of this length with vacation or sick leave benefits. Supra note 90. Insurance would
therefore be started only after the point when many workers would have exhausted employer-provided
leave. Up to one week of the waiting period would be excused if the worker had previously satisfied the
TDI waiting period
321. Once qualified, subsequent reoccurrences of the risk within the benefit year, if traceable to the
same underlying situation, would be compensable even if lasting fewer than three days' duration.
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provide lower contribution and benefit levels for these risks, since they seem to
be considered less worthy of income support, and because lower
reimbursement levels would help to combat the greater moral hazard.
Verification and monitoring mechanisms would also have to be developed to
ensure that only the deserving receive benefits, but the details of those
mechanisms are beyond the scope of this Article. Either eligibility
requirements could be modified, or a TANF safety net could be made available,
to ensure that low-wage workers are afforded reasonable insurance against
these risks. Although this program is distinctly separate from TDI, it would
likely be administered in conjunction with the UI and TDI systems, in order to
capitalize on existing administrative structures.
B. Application and Examples
To illustrate how a family might fare under FRIP, this Section considers by
way of example a fictitious couple, Alan and Becky Cooper, and the family
risks that they might experience as they journey through life.
The example begins when Alan and Becky are recently married and
expecting a baby. Alan works for a local manufacturing firm, which employs
approximately two-hundred workers. His wage rate is ten dollars per hour, and
he receives employer-based benefits such as vacation, health insurance, and
temporary disability insurance. Becky earns minimum wage as a cashier at a
small grocery store with thirty employees, and receives no fringe benefits.
As Becky's due date approaches, she is no longer able to stand at the cash
register throughout the entire work-day and her doctor advises her to leave
work until after the birth of her child. Today, because her employer has fewer
than fifty workers, she is not protected under the Family and Medical Leave
Act and so is not entitled to job-protected leave while disabled due to her
pregnancy. Under FRIP, FMLA would be expanded to cover employers with
twenty-five or more workers, and Becky would be able to remain out of work
for her pregnancy disability and childbirth for up to twelve weeks, while being
guaranteed an equivalent position upon her return.
Because Becky's salary produces approximately one-third of the Coopers'
income, Alan and Becky do not expect that they can make ends meet without it.
Therefore, Becky visits the local unemployment agency and files a claim for
benefits. Today, Becky is told that she does not qualify for UI because her
disability renders her unable to work, and she is sent home without benefits.
Under FRIP, Becky would also visit the unemployment agency, but her
application would also serve as an application for the national TDI program.
Becky would begin receiving TDI insurance after a one-week waiting period,
and would continue to do so until after the birth of her child. She could then
remain at home with her new infant until she had collected benefits for a total
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of twelve weeks. Today, Alan would only stay home with Becky and their
infant for the first ten days following the birth, because after that point he
would have exhausted his vacation time, and would have no other source of
income to support the family because his employer's private TDI policy does
not insure family risks. Under FRIP, Alan would also be eligible to receive
TDI for up to twelve weeks, because the birth of his child would be a
qualifying event.
Becky's combined disability and maternity leave lasts for thirteen weeks,
which is long enough for her to exhaust FMLA leave and again fall outside of
the Act's coverage. Becky telephones her employer and requests reinstatement
to her former position. Her employer advises her that it could not hold her
position open for thirteen weeks and it has been filled with a permanent
replacement. Becky resolves that as long as she must search for new
employment, she will only look for part-time work in order that she may spend
more time with her infant. Becky again files and application for unemployment
benefits, this time to help support the family while she engages in a job search.
Expecting to qualify for benefits because she is now able and available for
work, Becky is surprised when she is told that she still is not "able and
available" under today's requirements because she is seeking part-time work.
Although she advises the administrator that the majority of the cashier positions
in the local labor market are part-time, the administrator informs her that this is
irrelevant to a determination under UI. Under FRIP, Becky would be
considered able and available because the part-time requirement does not
unduly restrict her job search in the local market.
Becky eventually finds a job working part-time at another local
establishment, which employs twenty-three workers but offers no fringe
benefits. A few years later, Becky's sister is in a serious accident, and Becky is
the only relative who can care for her. Today, the FMLA does not provide
leave for Becky to provide this care, because siblings are not qualifying family
members under the Act. Becky must choose between her job and caring for her
sister. Under FRIP, caring for a sibling would be a qualifying event under
FMLA. Because Becky's employer has fewer than twenty-five employees,
however, she still would not qualify for job-protected FMLA leave, even under
the Proposal. Regardless, Becky would be eligible to apply for TDI benefits,
which would not require her to be eligible for FMLA to collect wage
replacement. Becky again travels to the unemployment office to apply for
benefits, but the administrator determines that Becky's combination of
minimum wage earnings and part-time work do not bring her above the TDI
work tests' threshold. However, Becky would still receive benefits because the
Coopers' low combined income renders them eligible for benefits from the
supplemental fund of MOE dollars. Becky may not even be aware that she was
receiving welfare benefits, because she would receive the same percent of pay
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as she did following the birth of her child. Because Becky's employer is not
covered by the FMLA, it would also receive paid benefits during her absence,
to help compensate for its additional costs of hiring a replacement for Becky.
After Becky's sister's recovery, Becky's employer reinstates her on the
basis of her superior work record. A few months later, the Coopers' daycare
provider unexpectedly discontinues services, and they have no one to care for
their child while they are at work. Alan takes time off and exhausts his entire
allotment of vacation and sick leave time while searching for new daycare, but
all of the child care facilities in town have waiting lists that are several months
long. Today, either Alan or Becky has to completely forego income at this
juncture, because there are no programs available to insure this risk. Under
FRIP, the Coopers would be eligible to receive benefits for "extended absences
to tend to family business." While these benefits would be less than they
received under TDI, the income replacement would still be invaluable for
paying expenses in the interim. The couple would likely determine it was
better for Becky to remain home at this point, because Alan earns a higher
wage rate. This benefit would require a two-week waiting period, but Becky
would already have satisfied one week of it earlier in the year while caring for
her sister. After an additional one-week period, Becky would begin collecting
benefits while she continued to search for a new daycare provider. Alan and
Becky would be able to pay their most important monthly bills and would not
have to incur significant debt in the interim. While Alan and Becky would not
have utilized all of the provisions of FRIP, they would benefit from each of the
expanded systems for insuring family risks, and would have far more income
security than under the current system.
C. Conclusion
"As society has changed we have always adjusted our labor protections
standards to meet the new circumstances., 322  The recent flurry of activity
surrounding paid Family and Medical Leave benefits indicates that our society
may now. be ready to respond to recent demographic changes and to update our
social insurance system to be more family-friendly. While FRIP may appear
radical as compared with the current state of affairs, it is in line with the states'
recent efforts to insure family risks. This Article has evaluated the various
proposals under consideration by academics and state legislatures, and has
selected those proposals that appear the most promising for inclusion in FRIP.
Recognizing the realities of the political process, this Article has recommended
a gradual phasing-in of several programs, but the proposals continually work
322. Deirdre A. Whittaker, The Conservative Era of the 1980's: Should We Have a National Leave
Policy: A Survey of Leave Policies, Problems, and Solutions, 34 How. L.J. 411,417 (1991) (citing 136
CONG. REc. H2199 (daily ed. May 10, 1990) (statement of Rep. Roukema)).
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towards the goal of improved income security. Overall, this proposal has the
potential to provide true income security to all workers facing family risks.
